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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Joel Roberts Poinsett (1779-1851) was a Charlestonian Huguenot, a world-
traveler, and a statesman. Poinsett negotiated the promises and demands of the new
United States republic during his service as a diplomat, politician, and ethnographer,
using the doctrine of republicanism as both his guide and shield. As a youth, he traveled
in Europe, Russia and Turkey, an experience that would provide the basis for his later
anthropological contributions. Between the years 1810 and 1841, he served his country in
a variety of important capacities, as a diplomat, senator, Secretary of War, and patron of
the arts and sciences. Poinsett's career straddled the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras. He
exemplified the transition from a republic based in the rhetoric of natural rights and
inclusion to one that pursued hemispheric dominance and territorial acquisition. Poinsett
embodied the tensions between international republicanism and national self-interest.
Both found expression in the application of nineteenth-century republican ideology, and
the career of Joel Poinsett.
Republicanism was a defining component of national identity inthe early years
of the United States. At once foundational and fluid, republican ideology provided
political leaders in the United States, like Poinsett, with a vocabulary with which to
2distinguish themselves from European colonialism and tyranny. In classical terms, the
arbitrary and self-serving authority of a monarch would be replaced with a political
system based on the participation of the people conducting the business of the public for
the common good. The republic relied on abstract concepts with concrete applications:
liberty, or the freedom from the arbitrary power of a hereditary ruler, and virtue, the
patriotic sacrifice of personal ambition to the integrity of the republic. A republic
required earnest participation and selfless cooperation from each citizen. Before the
American Revolution, many enlightenment philosophers believed that these vital
ingredients could only survive as guiding principles in small republics. Large nations
were vulnerable to factionalism and competing interests, and regarded as unlikely
locations for successful republican governments. 1
The United States established a republican form of government after successfully
severing colonial ties with Great Britain in 1776. The new republic derived authority
from the will of the people and guaranteed that the rule of law applied to all, regardless of
status or hereditary claims to power. Freedom ofthe press and freedom of religion were
constitutionally protected, seen by national founders like Thomas Jefferson as necessary
components of a free and independent republic.2 Liberty was protected through suffrage,
representative government, and the separation of powers. The elective franchise was
restricted to landowners in order to guarantee the virtue of the republic. The limitations to
1 For a complete academic definition of republicanism, see The Blackwell Encyclopedia ofPolitical
Thought, ed. David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly, Alan Ryan (New York: B. Blackwell, 1987).
2 See Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia (Richmond: 1.W. Randolph, 1855).
Jefferson discusses many of the opportunities and constraints facing the U.S., and the freedoms that
protected the integrity of the U.S. republic.
3civic rights and participation were attempts to ensure that the voting public, as
landowners, had a stake in the integrity of the nation, and the means to remain
independent of coercive economic influence. Jefferson considered landownership to be
the foundation for a healthy republic, with the self-sufficiency of yeoman farmers acting
as a bulwark against the centralization of power and the advent oftyranny.3 Free from
dependence and committed to the principles which have empowered them, members of
the yeoman republic were ideally suited to participate in the social contract between
government and citizens. Land made men republicans, and access to land made republics
prosper.
American revolutionary leaders that claimed the tenets of republicanism had
universal appeal and application. Although the United States was a slave-trading nation
that restricted political participation to white, landowning men, the nation inspired others
with its promises of liberty and virtue. The United States demonstrated the feasibility of
republicanism for skeptical European colonial empires. Creoles, men ofEuropean (and
for the purposes of this thesis, Spanish) descent, who were born in the New World and
denied political representation or authority, also observed the experiment in liberty and
national independence in the United States. Jefferson imagined the potential of
hemispheric republicanism and described a collection of "sister republics" throughout the
Americas, connected through ideological affinity, free trade, and geographic proximity.4
3 Richard K. Matthews, The Radical Politics o/Thomas Jefferson (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,
1984),32-34, 78.
4 Thomas Jefferson, "First Annual Message, December 8, 1801," in Writings: Addresses, Messages, and
Replies, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Library Classics of America, 1984),501.
4The inclusive and internationalist characteristics of republican ideology promised mutual
respect and cooperation between fellow republics, although the inferiority ofAfrican
Americans and Native Americans was an intrinsic assumption. 5 As the nineteenth century
progressed, independence movements consumed the Spanish colonies while the United
States modeled a thriving republic. 6 Fundamentally anti-monarchical, the United States
inspired many Creole revolutionaries as they sought their national independence and
sovereignty. Poinsett and other republican enthusiasts traveled to Spanish America
seeking political and economic connections with an air of evangelical certainty, yet
became entangled in the contradictions inherent in their ideology.
While imperial aspirations may have been embedded within U.S. plans for
economic expansion, American attempts to dominate trade in South America and Mexico
were relatively benign. Economic expansion enabled the public and private accumulation
of wealth that rendered the experiment in republicanism viable. As former colonies
sought independence from colonial empires, trade agreements with other sovereign
nations bolstered their claims to nationhood. By binding together business and political
leaders committed to anti-monarchical tenets, the economic expansion that the United
States pursued through free-trade agreements with former colonies ostensibly
strengthened republican ties between nations and men. Yet many republicans viewed the
5 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins ofAmerican Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981),98-104.
6 Alfredo Avila, "Pensamiento republicano hasta 1823," in El republicanismo en Hispanoamerica: Ensayos
de historia intellectual y politica, eds. Jose Antonio Aguilar and Rafael Rojas (Mexico DF: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 2002), 319-321.
5relationship between liberty and commerce with suspicion, pointing to the contradictory
co-existence of self-interest and republican virtue.?
The imperial nature of the United States republic became evident as it moved to
extend its borders westward. The yeoman agrarian ideal depended on a limitless access to
landownership. Territorial expansion was inherent to Jefferson's yeoman republic;
sufficient land was the only way to support a growing citizenry and ensure their
independence and self-sufficiency.8 Access to land not only prevented factional divisions,
coercion, and dependence, it also provided the avenue to social mobility. Factionalism
and competing interests would be avoided through self-sufficiency, which would be
ensured through land-ownership. Jefferson contemplated a racially and ideologically
homogenous republic, extending, at a future date "when our rapid multiplication will
expand itself," to "cover the whole northern, ifnot southern continent.,,9 The growing
yeoman republic could not, in Jefferson's view, "contemplate with satisfaction either blot
or mixture on that surface," but the need for imperial action or exclusionary ideology was
far off in "distant times.,,10 Land generated the ability to accumulate resources, and
provided citizens egalitarian opportunities to achieve their best. Republicanism was a
fragile system that relied on territorial expansion, and by extension, national self-interest.
7 lG.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975),462.
8 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 535.
9 Thomas Jefferson, The Works ofThomas Jefferson Vol. XL ed Paul Leicester Ford (New York and
London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905),317.
10 Jefferson, The Works ofThomas Jefferson, 317.
6In a world of competing colonial empires, territorial acquisition, if not a noble goal, was
an integral part of what it meant to be an empire. The expansion of the United States at
the expense of European empires during the Jeffersonian Republic, for example
Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 and the later conquest of Florida,
was rhetorically justifiable. The extension of the yeoman republic into Spanish territory
could be viewed as liberation not imperialism. However, in a hemisphere of sisterly
nations united by adherence to republican ideology, the encroachment of one nation's
borders into the territory of another's was explicitly aggressive and implicitly imperial. In
the early 1800s the distinctions between New World republicanism and Old World
imperialism were important, but remained undefined.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the territory of the United States
grew to meet the need for land, through the appropriation of land domestically, from
Indian tribes, and internationally, from Mexico. The expansion of the United States was
set against an ideological background that pitted European monarchies against
independent republics, and the moral bankruptcy of colonial imperialism against the self-
evident virtue of republicanism. How could an authentic republic foster republican
institutions in another nation while simultaneously endeavoring to annex their territory?
How could sincere American republicans (like Poinsett) inculcate internationalist values
to their "sister republics," while pursuing agendas of national self-interest that infringed
on their neighbor's sovereign borders? How could the United States deny the authenticity
of another nation's republicanism as a prelude to land seizure?
7An exploration of Joel Poinsett's career illustrates the paradox of imperial
republicanism. During his service to the United States, Poinsett grappled with his own
understanding of the intersection of republicanism and national self-interest. Through his
experiences as a United States diplomat and politician, Poinsett developed strategies and
theories that both broadcast republican ideology among newly independent American
nations, and ultimately undermined their claims to the land within their sovereign
borders. Poinsett obscured and refined his understanding of republicanism through a
complicated combination of authenticity and self-interest. Poinsett developed an ideology
that allowed him to navigate the contradictions between republican theory and republican
pragmatism, through decades of travel, service to his country, and the articulation of his
anthropological beliefs.
The spectrum of opinions regarding Poinsett's role in the United States'
diplomatic and domestic history ranges widely. Historians' perceptions of his activities
vary, from evil to heroicY Chilean and Mexican supporters, who were Poinsett's
contemporaries, praised his virtue and described him as an "ardent republican" and the
"apostle of liberty." 12 On the other hand, his detractors and opponents decried his inter-
hemispheric meddling, calling his tactics "Machiavellian," and Poinsett himself the
11 For the uncritical account of Poinsett, see Fred Rippy, Joel Poinsett, Versatile American (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1935); for the scathing indictment of his influence on the early republic of Mexico, see
Jose Fuentes Mares, Poinsett, historia de una gran intriga, (Mexico DF: Ediciones Oceano, S.A, 1982).
12 Lorenzo de Zavala, Manifiesto de los principios politicos del Escmo. Sr. D.J.R. Poinsett (Mexico City:
Impr. del Correo, 1828),2-3.
8"author of all that is evil." 13 In contrast to these overly simplified or reactionary
interpretations, my analysis of Poinsett seeks to understand the range of disparate
interpretations of his place in history, and provide a framework for understanding the
man and his era. The methodology employed in this thesis, however, is not one of
biography. Instead of applying historical context to Poinsett's life in an attempt to
understand him, my goal is to use elements of Poinsett's biography as access points into
the ideas and activities with which he engaged so enthusiastically. Poinsett will be the
lens into ideologies and motivations, both opaque and obvious, within the international
and domestic policies of the United States. 14 Poinsett's own agency within larger political
and economic forces needs not be exaggerated. He occupied positions of power and
maintained connections to many other powerful men, but he was not a puppet-master,
and his Creole and Native American peers were not hapless victims of his manipulation.
Instead, he was uniquely positioned and suited to reflect the tensions and transitions
within American republicanism.
This thesis will discuss three episodes in Poinsett's life that illustrate the paradox
of imperial republicanism, arguing that as a diplomat in South America, Poinsett learned
important lessons in his failed attempts to embed American cultural and economic
dominance within the Chilean state-building projects. He applied those lessons in
BRam6n Gamboa, Representaci6n del ciudadano sindico (Mexico City: Impr. Del C. A. Valdes, 1829),8;
"The Papers of Sir Charles Vaughan," The American Historical Review 7, no. 2 (1902): 304-329.
14 Biography examines individuals, while in microhistory "the individual's life serves as an allegory for
broader issues affecting the culture as a whole." See Jill Lepore, "Historians Who Love Too Much:
Reflections of Microhistory and Biography," Journal ofAmerican History 88, no. 1 (2000). She discusses
the similarities and difference between the two approaches, observing "microhistories can focus on key
events and episodes in an individual's life in order to "evoke and period, a mentalite, a problem," 132-133.
9imperial republicanism successfully in Mexico. Later, as commander ofthe United States
War Department, Poinsett then adapted and racialized his understanding of republicanism
to justify and perform Indian Removal. The focus on the three episodes in Chile, Mexico,
and the Cherokee Nation is derived from the richness and interconnectedness of the three
narratives, which, taken together, address the historical questions posed above.
Chapter One will begin with an exploration of hemispheric republicanism through
an analysis of Poinsett's early diplomatic career. From 1810 to 1814, the United States
government appointed Poinsett Consul General to rebelling South American
governments, or juntas in Buenos Aires and Santiago. He acted as a conduit for pro-
American and pro-republican information. He allied himself with Jose Miguel Carrera, an
aristocratic leader of a Chilean Creole junta, or ruling faction, and actively promoted
republican institutions. He worked to marginalize monarchical and colonial influence in
Chile, while pursuing preferential trade agreements in a self-interested rivalry with Great
Britain. This episode illustrates the promise of republicanism as an international doctrine
of inclusivity and reciprocal respect. It also reveals some of the limitations of the
ideology amidst several competing nationalistic agendas. Poinsett's involvement in
Chilean Creole independence movements and inter-elite rivalries taught him to choose
his next allies wisely. The failure of the tangible forms of republicanism that he promoted
in Chile to secure the preeminence of United States' influence in the region taught him to
act more aggressively to further the interests of his nation. Chile served as a workshop,
where Poinsett learned practical lessons in empire-building from competing, and
ultimately successful, British agents operating in the same region.
10
Chapter Two will analyze Poinsett's next diplomatic mission as Minister
Plenipotentiary to Mexico, from 1825 to 1829, with a brief explanation of his earlier trip
to the newly independent nation in 1822. Conditions in Mexico were very different from
those in Chile; the political leaders with whom Poinsett interacted had already broken
with Spain and established a sovereign nation. Poinsett's goals also differed in his second
diplomatic mission. Mexico and the United States shared a vast and sparsely settled
border. Armed with new strategies to combine republican rhetoric with imperial designs,
Poinsett attempted to renegotiate the United States-Mexico border and purchase the state
of Texas. Poinsett's years in Mexico expose the tensions and contradictions 'within an
increasingly imperial and land-hungry republic, and the hardening of United States
expansionistic aspirations. The United States officially defined its international posture
according to its opposition to European aggression with the proclamation of the Monroe
Doctrine in 1823. Contrary to common historical view, Poinsett's mission to Mexico will
be revealed to be a success, as the allies he chose, the networks he formed, and the
speculative land ventures he supported, all contributed to the establishment of the
Republic of Texas. 15
Chapter Three turns to a different arena of early U.S. imperialism, and Poinsett's
role in the removal of Native Americans west of the Mississippi River, to Indian Country.
As Secretary of War, Poinsett administered the removal of the Cherokee Indians from
Georgia, and the more pronounced tensions within his political thought became evident.
15 Rippy, 115-117. Rippy notes Poinsett's failure to buy Texas or successfully negotiate a lasting trade
agreement with the Mexican government, ignoring evidence that Poinsett facilitated the secession of Texas
through political masonry and land speculation.
11
Poinsett, a champion of republicanism, officially denied the legitimacy ofthe
republicanism of the Cherokee Nation. For these purposes, Poinsett deployed a racial
theory that restricted the capacity of indigenous people to adopt a truly republican form
of government. During the years 1837 through 1841, as the Secretary of War under
President Martin Van Buren, Poinsett applied racialized republicanism as his rationale in
the implementation ofIndian Removal. Poinsett's forcible removal of the Eastern
Cherokee from Georgia on the Trail ofTears occurred in the face of vigorous protests
from legally savvy and republican-minded Cherokee leaders and Anglo-American
supporters. This episode most clearly exposes the paradox of imperial republicanism
through the naked aggression displayed in Indian Removal. The land-hunger ofthe
republic and perceived racial differences ofNative Americans worked together to reshape
the definition of republicanism into one that tolerated the appearance of continental
imperialism, while simultaneously narrowing the definition to exclude the Cherokee
Nation, and its competing claims to valuable land. Poinsett adapted the strategy he had
developed in the former Spanish colonies fostering republican self-rule and national
sovereignty, to the demands of domestic expansion and Cherokee removal, rejecting the
Cherokees' republicanism, sabotaging their national viability, and attempting to depose
their elected leader.
12
CHAPTER II
HEMISPHERIC REPUBLICANISM:
JOEL POINSETT AND CHILE
Joel Poinsett lived in South America from 1810 to 1814, first in Buenos Aires,
and then in Santiago. His appointment to the region illustrated the ideological, economic,
and geopolitical aspects of the United States interest in its "sister republics." The United
States' nascent republicanism, alternatively idealistic and pragmatic, found a foreign
laboratory in Chile. Poinsett was not only a representative of the United States who
publicly advocated a republican-style government; he actively and self-consciously
diffused ideologies and political policies that promoted an anti-monarchical social
contract between the Chilean people and a Creole-led government. He also pursued an
agenda of economic penetration, in competition with British agents in Chile, who also
intended to establish preferential trade agreements with Santiago. Poinsett attempted to
ensure the influence of the United States and procure trade agreements favoring the U.S.
through direct support of rebelling Creole juntas, or ruling Creole governments.
Poinsett sought alliance with Jose Miguel Carrera, the leader of the ruling
Chilean junta, in the hopes that would successfully lead the Chileans to independence,
and use his position as the executive of the nation to procure trade agreements that
------------------
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favored the United States. Poinsett used his credibility as the representative of the
successful and inspirational United States republic to support Carrera's hold on power.
Promoting the introduction of a printing press, newspaper, and provisional constitution,
Carrera and Poinsett collaborated to legitimize Carrera's hold on power through the
extension of republican liberty and claims to republican virtue. Poinsett's activity on
behalf of an authoritarian, and ultimately unpopular, leader like Carrera shows that
Poinsett's pragmatic and imperial intentions were veiled behind his republican rhetoric.
National self-interest took priority over democratic guarantees. The nature of Poinsett's
imperialistic intervention in Chile was economic, however, not territorial, and in the end,
unsuccessful. Poinsett's rival British representatives were unfettered by ideological
contradictions and emerged victorious in Chile. Great Britain, not the United States,
established lasting cultural and economic influence in Chile and other South American
nations.
In 1810, President Madison sent Joel Poinsett to Buenos Aires, as the United
States General Consul to South America. The independence movements of Spanish
colonies in the early nineteenth century were of great interest to political leaders in the
United States, and that interest was multi-faceted. Madison's Secretary of State, Robert
Smith, explained to Poinsett the significance ofhis mission in an official letter on August
27, 1810:
As a CrISIS IS approaching which must produce great
changes in the situation in Spanish America, and may
dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe, and as
the geographical position of the United States... give [us] an
intimate interest in whatever may affect the destiny of that
part of the American Continent, it is our duty to tum our
14
attention to this important subject and to take such steps not
incompatible with the neutral character and honest policy
of the United States as the occasion renders proper. With
this view, you have been selected to proceed without delay
to Buenos Aires, and thence, if convenient to Lima, in Peru,
or St. Tiago in Chili, or both. 16
The collapse of the Spanish colonial power, and the potential for both chaos and
independence concerned the Madison administration on a geopolitical pragmatic level,
but also resonated ideologically. For example, the Enlightenment philosophies that
inspired the authors of the Declaration of Independence also shaped the ideas of Creole
thinkers and revolutionaries. I? Complementary anti-monarchical agendas were possible,
as Thomas Jefferson had imagined. The western hemisphere could be occupied by "sister
republics," nations led by representatives committed to the same general principles of
virtue, law, and sovereignty, that were united by trade and good will, and free from the
colonial restraints of Europe.
Smith went on to instruct Poinsett:
You will make it our object wherever may be proper, to
diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the
sincerest good will toward the people of Spanish America
as neighbors, as belonging to the same portion of the globe
and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly
intercourse; that this disposition will exist whatever their
internal system or European relations, with respect to
which no interference of any sort is pretended; and that in
the event of a political separation from the parent country
and of the establishment if an independent system of
National Government, it will coincide with the sentiments
and policy of the United States to promote the most
16 Poinsett Papers (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania), Vol. I, folder I,
17 Charles C. Griffin, "Enlightenment and Independence," in Latin American Revolutions, 1806-1826: Old
and New World Origins, ed. John Lynch (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994),248.
15
friendly relations and the most liberal intercourse between
the inhabitants of the hemisphere, as having all the
common interest, and as lying under a common obligation
to maintain that system of peace, justice and good will,
which is the only source of happiness for nations. 18
Free trade was a significant concern to the Madison administration, and the
closed ports of Spanish America were often resented by ideologues and capitalists, as
evidence of the tyranny and futility of European monarchies. 19 Smith emphasized the
importance of establishing trade relationships with South American ports in his
instructive letter, telling Poinsett "The real as well as the ostensible object of your
mission is to explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United States to
promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the
subject.,,2o United States economic interests in Chile had primarily centered on
contraband whaling trade in defiance of Spanish trade restrictions. This interest coincided
with Poinsett's social connections, as a patron of Poinsett's, Dr. John Livingston, had
significant business interests in Chilean whaling trade, through his representative,
Matthew Arnold Hoeve1.21 Free trade, rather than contraband trade, incorporated ideas of
18 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 1.
19 Laura Bornholdt, Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism, a Study in the Background o/the Monroe
Doctrine (Northampton, Massachusetts: George Banta Publishing Company, 1949). Bornholdt profiles
Baltimore's economic involvement with Spanish America, the resentment of the Baltimore business
community for Spanish trade restrictions, and support of Creole independence movements.
19 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 1.
20 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 1.
21 William L. Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars ofIndependence," Hispanic American
Historical Review 27, no. 2 (1947): 204-205. Hoevel's career nicely embodies the intersection of American
interests and strategies in Chile. Hoelvel translated the fIrst act easing trade restrictions in Chile in 1810,
16
liberty into economic interests, and preexisting United States economic interests were
bolstered by liberal and stable trade agreements.
The United States' ideological and economic concerns were directly linked to
interactions between increasingly competitive national projects. Antagonism and warfare,
(between European powers during the Napoleonic Wars, and between the United States
and Great Britain in the War of 1812) affected commerce and international relations.
These tensions were displayed in the Spanish American colonies, as the United States,
Great Britain, France and Spain vied for cultural and economic hegemony in the region.
Spain attempted to maintain control over the ports of Spanish America. The United States
and Great Britain both pursued trade agreements, and advocated free-trade ideology.
Smith sought information on the region, on international relationships manifested there,
and on South American resources. He told Poinsett. "Whilst you inculcate these as the
principles and dispositions of the United States it will be no less proper to ascertain those
on the other side, not only towards the United States, but in reference to the great nations
of Europe.',22 He directed Poinsett to "inquire into the state, the characteristics, and the
proportions as to numbers, intelligence and wealth of the several parties, and the amount
of population, the extent of organization of the military force and the pecuniary resources
of the country.',23 The imperialism implied in this missive was economic, but in order to
from Spanish and English. He transported the first printing press to Chile in 1811 and sold it to the Carrera
government. Poinsett would later name Hoevel a Consul of trade to Chile, under his authority in 1812.
22 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 1.
23 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 1.
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implement his instructions, Poinsett would have to create an aura of international
republicanism and virtuous legitimacy.24
Smith instructed Poinsett to conduct his sensitive communications with the United
States government within encoded correspondence with the U.S. State Department. Smith
told Poinsett, "You will receive herewith a cipher, which...will enable you to correspond
in that mode...when occasion may render it necessary.,,25 Codes had been used by
participants in the American Revolution, and the use of them during diplomatic and
commercial interaction with South Americans implies a certain level of intrigue that
Poinsett's later actions would confirm.26 Poinsett was not concerned enough to encode
his general suspicion of European intentions in the southern hemisphere and discussed
European counterrevolutionary movements and international privateering activities.27 The
involvement of the United States in Spanish America, however, was communicated
between Poinsett and his contacts at the State Department through a complicated
numerical code that was replaced periodically to ensure the secrecy of diplomatic
communications, such as this excerpt from an encoded letter from Poinsett to James
Monroe in October, 1811 that explained that Poinsett "been enabled to place the policy of
the nations of Europe in its true light," and, that after sharing "a fair statement of the
24 Eugenio Pereira Salas, La actuaci6n de los oficiales navales norte-americanos en nuestras costas, 1813-
1840 (Santiago de Chile: Prensa de la Universidad de Chile, 1935),8-9. Salas called the United States and
Great Britain "imperial rivals," engaged in "gunboat diplomacy."
25 Poinsett papers, Vol. 1, folder 1.
26 Ralph E. Weber, United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 1775-1938, (Chicago: Precedent
Publishing Inc., 1979),5.
27 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 6; folder 3.
18
views of the British toward these colonies," Poinsett's contacts in Buenos Aires had
become "extremely excited against them, and their actions are watched with a jealous
eye.,,28 Poinsett went on to explain his efforts to connect the independence movements in
Spanish America to the interests of the United States:
I have found it necessary to direct their attention to some
plan of effecting their independence. I have suggested to
them... a barrier to the ambitious view of the European
powers, an alliance of all Spanish American engaged in the
same cause ... [They] declare themselves [ready] to solicit
the aid and protection of the United States and make one
great simultaneous movement of the whole continent.. .I
need scarcely observe that this has been conducted with the
greatest reserve and in the name of a Creole. 29
Poinsett communicated with the United States from his post in Buenos Aires by
relying on this secure system of communication. He informed the United States State
Department that he had not only spread anti-European sentiment, but had also acted on
behalf of, and in the name of, a member of the Creole leadership. Poinsett spent his time
in Buenos Aires gathering information on British, French and Spanish activity, and the
growing independence movement led by the Creoles. A month later, Poinsett informed
the State Department that he was leaving Buenos Aires for Chile. In cipher he
communicated his perception that the people of Buenos Aires were turning against
British interests, saying "the jealousy of the people is awakened and a formidable enemy
to the ambitious views of Great Britain... the new executive seems well disposed to the
28 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 12.
29 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 12.
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United States and certainly aware of the policy of Great Britain.,,30 Animosity between
Great Britain and the United States had not yet developed into the War of 1812, but
British involvement in South America evoked suspicion. Poinsett hoped to dissuade the
Creole leadership in Chile from aligning themselves with Great Britain and their
economic interests, and instead advocate hemispheric republicanism.
When Poinsett arrived in Santiago late in 1811 he found an actively revolutionary
Creole community. The era known in Chile as the Patria Vieja, or Old Fatherland, had
begun in 1810. After the retreat of the Spanish Viceroyalty in the wake of the Napoleonic
Wars in Europe, the Chilean Creole elite gained the political power that had been denied
them by the Spanish Crown. Showing an affinity for the American Revolution, the first
Chilean Congress opened on July 4, 1811. Although not explicitly revolutionary, the
coalition of liberal Creoles departed from Spanish precedent and passed laws relaxing
trade restrictions.31 An edict issued by the Creole government outlawed the import of
slaves to Chile, and decreed that all future children born to slave women would be
freed. 32 Although they passed laws that departed from the status quo, the Creole
legislatures were not as radical as other members of the Creole Chilean elite who favored
an ambitious independence project, or those who lived outside the capital and demanded
political representation through a more regional, or federal system. The first Chilean
congress centralized political power in Santiago, and excluded Creoles from the
30 Poinsett Papers Vol. 1, folder 11.
31 Poinsett Papers Vol. 1, folder 16.
32 Sergio Villalobos, A Short History ofChile (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria 1996), 83.
20
provinces far from the center of the government.33 The political process also lacked
popular representation. The imprisonment of the Spanish king ignited the independence
movement, but did not drastically alter the relationship between the majority of the
Chilean people and their governing body. Furthermore, the strength of the Creole
leadership was compromised by the divisions between regional, economic and
ideological interests. Influential families like the Carreras and the Larrains, an even more
powerful dynasty, grew impatient with the conservative reforms pursued by the first
Congress, and called for more meaningful independence and democratization
initiatives.34
Jose Miguel Carrera was an aristocratic Chilean, who had returned to Chile from
Spain in 1811 after fighting against Napoleon in Europe. Carrera's family traced their
ancestry back to the conquistadors, and enjoyed a position ofprestige and traditional
political power in Santiago. The Carreras were not part of the most politically powerful
group of Chilean families the "Eight Hundred," who, led by the Larrains, controlled vast
amounts ofland and capita1.35 The Carreras did, however, have a history of influence in
Santiago. The patriarch of the family, Ignacio de la Carrera, was a member of the first
Chilean Congress. His three sons, Jose Miguel, Juan Jose and Luis Carrera were generals
33 Gabriel Salazar, Construccion de Estado en Chile (1760-1860): Democracia de 'los pueblos "
militarismo ciudadano, golpismo oligarquico (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005), 109-110.
34 Stephen Clissold, Bernardo 0 'Higgins and the Independence ofChile (New York: Praeger, 1969), 94-95.
35 The "Eight Hundred" was the nickname for a coalition ofwealthy and entrenched families led by the
Larrains in Santiago. Excluded from the political and social opportunities available to men born in Spain,
members of the Eight Hundred wielded extraordinary power under Spanish rule and after independence.
See Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins, 93.
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in the army, commanded troops, and controlled artillery. Javiera, Jose Miguel Carrera,
Juan Jose and Luis's sister dedicated herself promoting "the cult of the family," or the
Carrera's hereditary claims to power, and self-evident superiority.36 At times allied and at
other times at odds with one another, the Carreras and the Larrains cooperated at this time
to further the cause of independence.
Jose Miguel Carrera rose to power in Chile through a succession of coups, the
first in collusion with the Eight Hundred, on September 4, 1811.37 Carrera and his
brothers, supported by the troops of grenadiers and artillery that they commanded,
surrounded the Congress and forced the ruling junta to resign. Many members of the
Congress were replaced by members of the Eight Hundred, and a new executive junta
was appointed that was under their control.38 The Carrera family was not directly
empowered by the Eight Hundred following the successful coup, and some historians
have theorized that Jose Miguel may have felt snubbed. After members of the Eight
Hundred were reported to have been boasting of their control over three members of the
executive junta, the well-armed Carrera is quoted as asking, "But who is the president of
the bayonets?,,39 Six weeks after leading the coup that put the junta of the Eight Hundred
into power, the Carrera brothers and their army overthrew them. Members of the defeated
36 Clissold, Bernardo 0 'Higgins, 93.
37 Salazar, Construccion de Estado en Chile, 115.
38 Salazar, Construccion de Estado en Chile, 123.
39 Quoted by Clissold, Bernardo 0 'Higgins, 94.
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group were arrested and congress was dismissed, and by December, Carrera had assumed
dictatorial powers.40 Once Carrera assumed power he imprisoned several of his rivals.41
It was at this moment that Poinsett arrived on the scene. Within weeks, Poinsett
was formally received by Carrera in what Poinsett described as "a most distinguished
manner." 42 On March 9, he explained his relationship with the Carrera family to James
Monroe in cipher, saying, "The Carreras still hold the reins of government, and are
favorable to a system of national independence.,,43 He went on to describe the
involvement of private United States citizens in the independence movement: "The
government has contracted with Americans to supply them 6,000 muskets and some
cannons ... with the assistance of two frigates, Guayaquil, which is in a defensive state,
might be taken, and Lima reduced in three months.,,44 Poinsett's interest in the tactical
details of the Spanish American movements was a persistent theme throughout his
correspondence from Buenos Aires and Santiago.45 Once in Chile, he became directly
involved the fight for independence in Spanish America.
Poinsett's decision to ally himself with Carrera was risky. Carrera's claim to
legitimacy was compromised by the violence of his seizure of executive control, the
competing claims to power and authority of other Chilean elites, and the dictatorial
40 Salazar, Construccion de Estado en Chile, 129-131.
41 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins, 95.
42 Poinsett Papers, VoLl, folder 11.
43 Poinsett Papers, folder 14.
44 Poinsett Papers, folder 14.
45 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 15.
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character of his regime. Once in power, Carrera needed to bolster the authenticity of his
right to lead the Chilean people into nationhood. First, he convinced Bernardo O'Higgins
to join his government as his deputy.46 O'Higgins was the illegitimate son of the former
Viceroy of Peru and a prominent leader in Chile's independence movement, and had
strong affiliations to the Eight Hundred, particularly the Larrains. O'Higgins' father had
been removed from his position years before because of his son's political activities in
England and his friendship with many advocates of Spanish American independence,
such as Francisco de Miranda and Jose de San Martin.47 However, the alliance did not
last. O'Higgins became alienated by Carrera's decision to arrest members of the Eight
Hundred, including close friends of O'Higgins. Carrera's mandates became increasingly
dictatorial, and after having come to power promising political representation to the
province, he instead worked to centralize political power and assert his authority.48 After
Carrera dismissed the congress he appointed Juan Jose Aldunate and Jose Nicolas de la
Cerda as members of the executive triumvirate, men widely regarded as Carrera's
puppets.49 Although identified by many historians as a dictatorial ruler, Carrera's
contributions to Chilean political culture have been widely recognized; particularly his
46 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins, 95.
47 Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue, La masoneria, su influencia en Chile: Ensayo historico, politico y social
(Santiago de Chile: Editorial Oribe, 1966),50-66.
48 Clissold, Bernardo a 'Higgins, 98.
49 Duncan Stewart Young, "The Eighteenth-Century Background for the Chilean Anny's Royalist Posture
during the Patria Vieja, 1810-1814" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1976), 232-250.
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use of the tangible symbols of republicanism in order to foster the ideology of
independence and revolution through propaganda. 50
Although Carrera lost O'Higgins' support, he used his affiliation with the newly
arrived American diplomat to reinforce the legitimacy of his claims to power. Poinsett
supported Carrera's hold on power during the Patria Vieja by helping him apply some of
the most recognizable and visible aspects of a republican government: independence
from monarchy, an active press, and constitutional protections. Poinsett was involved
with the development of the free press in Chile, and its implementation as a tool to
broadcast propaganda favorable to Carrera's regime. Poinsett helped Carrera write the
first provisional constitution of the Chilean nation, and even commanded revolutionary
troops against royalist armies. 51 The flexible nature of republican ideology supported
Carrera's hold on power by arming him with the language ofliberty and virtue, and the
pressures of the wars for independence allowed him to postpone democratization.
Poinsett endorsed the Carrera regime, and in tum, Carrera treated the United States'
interests with preference.
The Aurora de Chile, Chile's first newspaper, was printed on a printing press
owned by the Carrera regime. 52 The press was brought from the United States to Chile
50 Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics o/Chilean Independence, 1808-1833 (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1967), 124-129.
51 Eu10gio Rojas Mery, El general Carrera en el exilio (Santiago de Chile: Instituto Hist6rico Carrera,
1954),32. Rojas Mery details a letter from Carrera to Poinsett on January 26, 1816 that discusses the earlier
loan for the printing Press; Manuel Reyno Gutierrez, El pensamiento del Oral. Jose M Carrera (Santiago
de Chile: Reyno Gutierrez, 1975), 119. Reyno Gutierrez reproduces Carrera's will, in which Carrera's debt
to Poinsett is addressed.
52 Villalobos, A Short History o/Chile, 88; Neumann, "United States Aid to Chile," 206. Late in 1811,
Hoeve1 brought the press to Valpariso, and sold it to the Carrera government. Hoevel was representing Dr.
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in December, just as Poinsett arrived and Carrera seized power. The newspaper filled its
pages with praise of the "patriots," the pro-independence government led by Carrera.
Although not quite a free press, as it was owned and controlled by the Carrera
government, the Aurora de Chile encouraged nationalism and republicanism, and
promoted Enlightenment philosophies. The newspaper also presented a very positive
image ofthe United States' interest in Chile. The head printer that ran the press, Samuel
Johnston, was from the United States, as were his employees. 53
Early in 1812, the first issue, or the Prospecto, of the Aurora de Chile published
an essay written by Camilo Henriquez, the editor of the newspaper. The editorial
celebrated the ideas of liberty and virtue. Henriquez wrote of the power of producing and
spreading the written word, saying, "This is now in our power, the great, the precious
instrument of universal enlightenment, the press. ,,54 In February of 1812, the Aurora
printed the "Canci6n a la Aurora de Chile," a song that celebrated the potential ofthe
nation:
The beautiful Chile has sprung to life to bring to light this
beautiful day ...How many precious fruits and gifts the wise
author of nature distributed in the various kingdoms and
nations. To Chile he gave both (fruits and gifts), what
wealth! But idleness and sloth did not recognize the fruits
and gifts, or have the strength to see them grow. The force
and constraints that oppressed you, Chile, for such a long
Livingston's contraband whaling interests off the coast of Chile, and also supporting U.S interests in the
region. Madison had sent a letter to Poinsett earlier in 1811, making sure Poinsett and Hoevel were working
together. See Poinsett Papers, Vol. folder 5.
53 Samuel B. Johnston, Cartas escritas durante una residencia de tres aPios en Chile (Santiago-Valparaiso:
Soc. Impr.-lit. "Barcelona," 1917),21.
54 Aurora de Chile, "Prospecto," February 1812.
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time rendered useless most of your genius and art. Poor
Chile, your fertile soil could have brought in million and
millions, if you had allowed extractions and if you would
have freed your commercial market. 55
The song went on to describe the wealth of Chile's gold and silver resources, and the
deprivation the nation suffered under Spanish rule and restrictions.
The Aurora de Chile provided the Chilean readers with a very positive description
of Poinsett's presence in Santiago. In March, the newspaper featured an article on
Poinsett's official welcome as Council General of Trade to Chile. The Aurora de Chile
reproduced Carrera's assurances that Chile shared in the commercial and social goals of
the United States, and that "this [was] the universal feeling of our people," and Poinsett's
corresponding assurances that the United States sought a mutually beneficial economic
relationship and that the two nations should view one another as "friends and natural
allies." 56 On April 9, the newspaper reported that Poinsett had made Matthew Hoevel
Consul to Chile, indicating a unity between U.S. trade and diplomatic interests. 57
On July, 4 1812, Poinsett hosted the party to celebrate the introduction of the new
Chilean flag. 58 Poinsett explained the way he envisioned those connections between the
two nations in a letter to Carrera the day before the party, saying that it was, "a special
coincidence that on that same date of my fatherland's separation from Great Britain [we
celebrate the] creation of the Chilean national flag. This gives curious significance to
55 Aurora de Chile, "Canci6n a la Aurora de Chile," February 27, 1812.
56 Aurora de Chile, "Llegada del c6nsul Joel Roberts Poinsett," March 2, 1812; Johnston, Cartas, 21-22.
57 Aurora de Chile, "Mateo Roevel nombrado C6nsul de EE.UU.," April 9, 1812.
58 Aurora de Chile, "Manejo de Informaci6n," July 9, 1812..
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tomorrow's celebration, in which we will see interwoven the symbols of two sister
nations."s9 An anthem written to be recited at the party Poinsett hosted on the fourth of
July was printed July 14 in the Aurora de Chile, establishing support for a ceremony
where the Chilean flag was introduced and raised alongside the flag of the United States.
One ofthe stanzas of the anthem began, "the illustrious patriotism of Washington extends
its embrace to the strong South. A new world is reunited in eternal confederation," and
the chorus repeated "Applaud, applaud! The heroes that the heavens gave to the
Fatherland, as the glory elevated the glory of the Fatherland - which was never
expectedl,,60 The identities of the two nations were linked by their ideological similarities
and the connection between Carrera and Poinsett. These links were in turn supported
through the national newspaper, which had purchased its printing press from the future
United States Consul appointee, Hoevel.
The Reglamento constitucional provisorio de 1812, or the Chilean Provisional
Constitution of 1812, was another very promising component of Chilean republicanism
that was fostered and influenced by Poinsett. Poinsett helped Carrera write and present
the provisional constitution.61 The two men worked closely together on the document.
59 William M. Collier and Guillermo Feliu Cruz. La primera mision de los Estados Unidos de America en
Chile (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1926),60. This extraordinary text reproduces many
documents only available at the U.S. embassy in Santiago, including many letters between Poinsett and
Carrera that are not otherwise available.
60 Aurora de Chile, "Himno Patri6tico," July 16, 1812.
61 Simon Collier notes the reforms Carrera pursued, but also his "military and absolute rule." See Simon
Collier, Ideas and Politics o/Chilean Independence, 12. Poinsett's influence on the fIrst Chilean
constitution is well documented by scholars of Chilean history, although the degree to which the document
provided the basis for a liberal society is a subject of debate. Eugenio Pereira Salas briefly treats the fIrst
Chilean constitution, focusing on the liberal aspects of the document, such as freedom of the press and
separation of the church and state. See Eugenio Pereira Salas, La influencia norteamericana en las
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When Poinsett delivered his draft of the Chilean constitution, he noted that he was
"submitting the constitution that we developed together ... as we haven't spent enough
time on it, it wouldn't be unexpected that some changes are made.,,62 The constitution
defined the Chilean nation, while also declaring loyalty to King Ferdinand VII, in
defiance of the French who had deposed and imprisoned him. Poinsett's draft of the
Constitution of 1812 stayed true to many tenets of republicanism, such as religious liberty
and his version of the constitution was devoid of Roman Catholic rhetoric. The document
organized a Chilean Congress divided into a senate and a lower house, responsible for the
protection of the freedom of the press and individual rights.63 The executive, or Gran
Jeje, would command the military and attend to foreign policy.64 Together, the two
branches would collaborate and appoint ambassadors, provincial officials, judges and the
Supreme COurt.65
After some revisions the Reglamento constitucional provisorio was completed
and approved in October 1812.66 The document laid the foundation for an independent
nation governed by a representative government negotiating a path to nationhood that
primeras constituciones de Chile (Santiago de Chile: Talleres Gnificos Valdes Hnos., 1945),6-8. Pedro
Lira Urquieta presents a very positive account of Poinsett's influence on the Constitution of 1812,
particularly the original draft's absence of references to Roman Catholicism. See Pedro Lira Urquieta, Jose
Miguel Carrera (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1960), 31.
62 William M. Collier and FeliU Cruz, La primera mision, 86-87.
63 William M. Collier and Feliu Cruz, La primera mision, 86-87.
64 Pereira Salas, La influencia norteamericana, 7-8. Collier and Feliu Cruz reproduce Poinsett's draft of the
1812 constitution in La primera mision, 71.
65 Pereira Salas, La irifluencia norteamericana, 8.
66 Lira Urquieta, Jose Miguel Carrera, 3 I.
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paid homage to the king of Spain while supplanting the authority of the Spanish Crown,
and supported the dictatorial mandates of general and executive Carrera while protecting
the rights of the new Chilean citizenry. However, the revisions to Poinsett's draft limited
the liberal language, and prominently featured governmental deference to the Catholic
Church.67 Although the document was never fully implemented, the provisional
constitution promised political power to the Chilean people, and authorized them to
intervene if the government acted outside of constitutionallaw.68
In March 1813, the royalists in the Viceroyalty of Peru invaded Chile near
Talcahuano to suppress the patriots and the increasingly independent junta led by
Carrera.69 O'Higgins, previously alienated by the arrogance of the Carrera government,
rejoined Carrera, and defended the newly-defined Chilean nation against the
counterrevolutionary forces. 7o Poinsett acted as Carrera's chief military advisor during
successful battles early in the campaign against the Peruvian Viceroyalty. Chile did not
have a navy, and was vulnerable to sea attacks. On April 5, 1813, merchant ships,
manned by more than fifteen Americans merchants, printers, and Chilean supporters,
blockaded the port of Talcahuano from Spanish invasion, with the printer of the Aurora
de Chile, Samuel Johnston second in command of the Colt. 71 The printers, merchants,
67 Junta de Gobiemo, Reglamento constitucional provisorio (Santiago de Chile: Impr. del Gobiemo, 1812).
68 Salazar, Construccion de Estado en Chile, 137-9.
69 Rippy, Joel Poinsett, 48-52.
70 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins pg 103-104.
71 Neumann, "United States Aid to Chilean Wars," 207.
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and Chilean revolutionaries were successful in the port of Tacahuano. However, divisions
between Carrera and O'Higgins ultimately weakened both Carrera's claim to power, and
the Chilean fight for independence.72 The patriot's resistance to royalist attacks began to
falter. After spending over a year pursuing legitimacy through republican rhetoric and
symbols, and independence through military action, Carrera's government began to lose
its grip on power. Military failures undermined "the president of the bayonets." After the
royalist victory at Chilhin in October 1813, Carrera and his brother were temporarily
captured and imprisoned by the royalists, and this provided his rivals within Chile an
opportunity to seize power.73 Troops loyal to O'Higgins and the Eight Hundred turned on
the Carreras. The junta in Santiago became more sympathetic to the Eight Hundred and
suspicious of Carrera's dictatorial grasp on power and military ineptitude. While Carrera
was detained, the junta decided to remove him from power.74
During Carrera and his brother's imprisonment by royalists, the factions loyal to
O'Higgins made no direct effort to secure their freedom, even though they fought a
common enemy.75 After weeks of confinement, Carrera and his brother escaped from the
royalists that held them captive. They survived without help from O'Higgins, but reunited
with him once again to fight the royalists, apparently considering the risk of Spanish
reconquest more significant than his competition with fellow revolutionaries. Carrera and
72 Lira Urquita, Jose Miguel Carrera, 22-54; Reyno Gutierrez, El pensamiento del Gral. Jose M Carrera,
9.
73 Clissold, Bernardo 0 'Higgins, 109.
74 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins, 112-114.
75 Clissold, Bernardo 0 'Higgins, 119-123.
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O'Higgins worked out a battleground compromise and restored their alliance. With
O'Higgins' support, Carrera returned to power, and the factions worked together to repel
royalist advances. On October 1, 1814, however, the patriots suffered a devastating loss
to the Spanish royalist forces at Rancagua. Communication broke down between the two
revolutionary factions and the royalists capitalized on the lack of cooperation between the
troops led by the Carreras and those that followed O'Higgins. Carrera failed to provide
O'Higgins with crucial support, and the patriots were routed. The defeat at Rancagua
marked the end of the Patria Vieja and the restoration of Spanish royalist control over
Chile.76
The opposition and competition between Carrera and O'Higgins had obvious
human and strategic costs. The divisions between the Creole factions also reflected an
international opposition and competition between the United States and Great Britain.
Poinsett's influence over Carrera and his involvement with both printing political
propaganda and writing a constitution had fostered pro-United States sentiment among
Carrera and his allies. However, Poinsett's position in Chile depended on the success of
the Carrera regime, to both fend off Spanish attacks and maintain authority within the
Creole revolutionary elites. Carrera's rivals, particularly O'Higgins, had ties to the
British. The U.S. and Great Britain were engaged in the War of 1812, and Poinsett's
British rivals were eager to see his influence in Chile diminish, as were members of the
Chilean elite, who had accused him of fomenting discord in Chile and criticized his
76 Villalobos, A Short History o/Chile, 93.
32
active support of the Carrera dictatorship.77 Poinsett and Carrera were linked in the minds
of many, and Poinsett's activities were seen as out of line with the type of disinterest
expected from a man in his diplomatic position. Once Carrera began to lose power,
Poinsett's influence in Chile too began to wane.
British influence ultimately displaced that of the United States. The same free-
market ideals that Poinsett was directed to espouse in his letter of instructions from the
Secretary of State also favored the British. British agents, like Poinsett, worked to
establish favorable trade agreements with Chilean Creoles, and edge out their enemies in
the United States.78 The United States' interests in Chile were vulnerable, predicated on
the ability of the Carrera government to maintain the authority to wield force. The
divisions among the Chilean elites gave purchase to the British interests, who
pragmatically negotiated a middle ground between the patriots and the royalists. The
British were able to engage in free trade, while remaining comparatively untainted by
Chilean factionalism and the implied hypocrisy of empty rhetoric. In contrast, Poinsett
bound United States trade interests to Chilean liberty, republican ideology, and the
success of an authoritarian aristocrat.
Many leaders of the Chilean independence movement were also bound to British
citizens through cultural and fraternal networks. O'Higgins and other important Creole
77 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 16.
78 British presence during Patria Vieja was minimal, but after 1817 commercial ties between the two
nations became strong and British immigration was encouraged. In 1818, the British government sold the
O'Higgins government the warship Windham, which was renamed the Lautaro. See Jay Kinsbruner, "The
Political Influence of the British Merchant Residents in Chile During the O'Higgins Administration, 1817-
1823," The Americas 27, 1 (1970): 27-31.
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revolutionaries were members of a masonic lodge known as the Lautaro. The Lautaro
lodge was founded by admirers of Francisco de Miranda as an instrument of Spanish
American independence earlier in the century, organized around the Matriz Lodge in
London.79 During years spent in England, the founding members of the Lautaro Lodge,
Jose San Martin and Simon Bolivar, formed the fraternal society committed to Miranda's
goals.80 Organized around the strong and compelling purpose of Spanish American
independence and the unification of the Americas, the Lautaro Lodge had roots in
England and ties to other liberal British voluntary associations. Members like San Martin
and O'Higgins, established economic and political ties with British counterparts.8]
O'Higgins' ties to Miranda reached back to O'Higgins' youth, when Miranda tutored him
in mathematics. 82
Carrera never achieved the high degree of intimacy with the Lautaro lodge
members that they enjoyed with one another, perhaps because he did not live in England,
but instead spent his time in Spain fighting Napoleon, or perhaps, as some historians
theorize, his interests were not inter-continental and did not tend toward grand
79 Fabian Onsari, San Martin, la Logia Lauta;o y la francomasoneria (Buenos Aires, Supremo Consejo del
Grado 33 y Gran Logia de la Masoneria Argentina, 1964), 74. For a rich explanation of Miranda activities
in the Spanish American independence movements in the early 1800s, see Karen Racine, Francisco de
Miranda, a Transatlantic Life in the age ofRevolution (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003).
80 Onsari, San Martin, 74-97.
81 Pinto Lagarrigue, La masoneria, 66.
82 For a compelling analysis of the usage of freemasonry in service to the British Empire during the mid-
Nineteenth Century, see Jessica Harland-Jacobs, '''Hands across the Sea': The Masonic Network, British
Imperialism, and the North Atlantic World," Geographical Review 89, 2 (1999): 237-241. She maps out the
masonic lodges and affiliations that connected the British Empire like a "vast chain." Her identification of
Freemasonry as a tangible network linking an international brotherhood of British imperialists throughout
India and other British colonies is particularly important in understanding the function ofmasonic lodges in
the developing American republics.
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unification, but instead represented more local and nationalistic goals.83 Another indicator
that Carrera was not a central member of the lodge is the observation that Lautaro lodges
were not a part of Carrera's regime in 1812 and 1813. Only after O'Higgins and San
Martin liberated the Southern Cone from Spain in 1817 did the lodges spread rapidly
throughout Chile.84 While the precise reasons for Carrera's exclusion from the Lautaro
lodge remain unclear, the consequences of his exclusion were decisive after the patriots
were defeated by the royalists. His rejection by the men, who would eventually be known
as the 'liberators,' was demonstrated once the patriots fled to Argentina. In October of
1814, after the royalist forces routed O'Higgins and Carrera at the battle of Rancagu,
O'Higgins led his forces over the Andes to be welcomed and sheltered by San Martin and
integrated into his army in Cuyo, Argentina. 85 Having heard of his tyranny and
incompetence from O'Higgins, San Martin did not extend a welcome or any warmth to
Carrera, who arrived later. Having already recognized O'Higgins as the legitimate leader
of the Chilean patriots, San Martin displayed his disdain for Carrera by threatening to
search his bags for looted Chilean wealth upon Carrera's arrival in CuYO.86 Alienated
from San Martin and O'Higgins, Carrera allied himself with an Argentine, Carlos Maria
83 Pinto Lagarrigue, La masonerfa., 66.
84 Rojas Mery, EI general Carrera en el exilio, 60-65.
85 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins, 132-133.
86 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins., 134-135.
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de Alvear, who was briefly the Supreme Director of the Argentinejunta, until he himself
was ousted and replaced by another prominent member of the Lautaros. 87
Carrera's original fall from power in 1813 had doomed Poinsett's mission. When
Carrera was imprisoned by the royalists following the battle of Chillan, Poinsett was
suddenly without allies in a hostile land. He tried to use his influence to convince
O'Higgins to secure Carrera's release. In a letter to O'Higgins on April 11, 1814, Poinsett
implored him to arrange a prisoner exchange to free the Carrera brothers, but O'Higgins
made no move toward the release of his rival. 88 Instead of responding to Poinsett,
O'Higgins displayed sympathy to the British by meeting with Captain Hillyar, a British
Navel officer intent on supplanting Poinsett's influence in Chile. British opinion was very
much against Poinsett, as implied by correspondence between British that accused
Poinsett of abusing his influence over Carrera, "circulating poison... [and] contaminating
the whole population on that side of the continent. ,,89
Captain Hillyar had come to Chile with arms, ships, and the Treaty of Lircay. The
latter was a peace deal the British were attempting to broker between the Chilean patriots
and the Spanish royalist forces.9o The British laid equal odds on the struggle between
colonialism and independence, cultivating friendly trade relationships with both the
patriots and royalists. With Carrera imprisoned and Poinsett vulnerable, Hillyar asserted
87 Pinto Lagarrigue, La masoneria, 67-68.
88 William M. Collier and Feliu Cruz, La primera mision, 182.
89 Edward Tagart, A Memoir o/the Late Captain Peter Heywood, R.N. (London: E. Wilson, 1832),256-
257.
90 Clissold, Bernardo O'Higgins, 123-125.
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British dominance over the United States in Chile, extending the battleground of the War
of 1812 to the neutral Chilean waters.91 In March of 1814, Poinsett attempted to leave
Chile on the American ship, the Essex. His friend Commodore David Porter, the
commander of the ship, had returned to the port of Valparaiso, having visited Chile the
previous year. As Porter, Poinsett, and the men ofthe Essex attempted to leave the port,
Hillyar approached, commanding the British frigates the Cherub and the Phoebe. Hillyar
ordered the frigates to prevent the Essex from sailing out of the port ofValparaiso. While
Chilean troops remained passive onlookers, the British engaged the American frigate.
The British ships fired on the Essex for three hours, after the American ship had become
disabled due to an incident with its anchor.92 One third to one half ofthe men on the
Essex were killed.93 After the incident, Captain Hillyar arranged for the surviving crew
members of the Essex, including Porter, to be transported to the United States on the
Essex Jr. 94 In an insulting gesture, Hillyar would not allow Poinsett to accompany them.95
On ApriI1?, 1814, as he departed Chile, Porter wrote a letter to Poinsett, telling him that
Chile was "uncontrollable," and the British influence was, "more decisive everyday, in
spite of all our efforts." Poinsett had accomplished all that was possible, without a
"superior force," Porter assured him.96 Porter went on to urge Poinsett to leave Chile as
91 Donald R. Hickey, The War of1812: A Short History (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995),51.
92 William M. Collier and Feliu Cruz, La primera misi6n, 178-179.
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soon as possible. "You have done everything you can for your friends, nothing more can
be expected, so now you should think of saving yourself.,,97 Poinsett fled Chile over the
Andes with Juan Jose Carrera, eventually making his way back to Buenos Aires.98
By the time Poinsett reached Charleston a year later, in May of 1815, Carrera had
escaped the royalist prison, rejoined O'Higgins, lost to the royalists at the disaster of
Rancagua, been replaced by O'Higgins as the recognized leader of the Chilean patriots,
rejected by San Martin, and excluded from the dominant project of Spanish American
Independence. Carrera lost power to his rival, O'Higgins, and with Carrera's exclusion
from authority, the influence of the United States in the Chile and Argentina declined,
while the region's economic, political and cultural connections with Great Britain grew
even stronger.
Carrera lived in exile in Argentina after fleeing Chile and the Spanish restoration
following the Battle of Rancagua. He then traveled to the United States to seek arms,
ships, money and volunteers to enable him to retake Chile from royalist rule.99 Carrera
had counted on Poinsett's support in his efforts, but found him somewhat distracted.
Carrera did inspire enthusiasm among many merchants and ideologues in the United
States, particularly in Baltimore, where trade relationships with Spanish America had
been already established. 100 Carrera reunited with Porter, the Commodore of the sunken
97 Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, folder 16.
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99 William M. Collier and Feliu Cruz, La primera mision, 208.
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Essex and also wrote editorials for the Baltimore Patriot and the New York Columbian
that explained his claim to power in Chile. lOI Carrera's cabal of supporters included
Aaron Burr, Eli Whitney, Baptist Irving, John Skinner, DeWitt Clinton and others. 102
Porter and Carrera solicited support from Baltimore investors and businessmen, and
arranged to buy gunpowder from Charles Dupont. l03 Carrera eventually visited Poinsett
in Charleston, where he was introduced to John Jacob Astor, and together they
coordinated a purchase of armaments. 104 Carrera and his American supporters organized
the "Expedici6n chiquita," a plot to invade and liberate Chile. 105 Carrera planned a
"Congress of the Americas," with himself at the head of a loose coalition of independent
Spanish American nations, protected by the United States. 106 However, Carrera and the
arms and ships he had acquired in the United States were seized by O'Higgins, San
Martin, and Bolivar, who briefly imprisoned Carrera and used the arms to liberate Chile
and Peru. 107 Carrera was again marginalized, and spent the rest of his life seeking power
and revenge. In 1818, after his brothers were executed by an associate of O'Higgins,
Carrera wrote a proclamation "To the Free Citizens of Chile," which outlined his
101 Bornholdt, Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism, 60-70.
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bitterness. 108 He condemned the "tyranny of the most detestable, iniquitous triumvirate,"
which had "subjected [his brothers] to horrible prisons, dungeons, and chains; [they] had
been abandoned in the middle of their own country... and perished like common criminals
on April 8. What a dark and horrifying day in Chile.,,109 Carrera blamed the leadership of
the Lautaros for ordering the execution, saying "Pueyrred6n, San Martin, and
O'Higgins-they are the barbarous assassins. The cowardly and effeminate [executioner]
was no more than an agent for these sanguinary monsters who were vomited by hell for
the condemnation of our American."110 Carrera continued to malign the Lautaros in
letters and newspaper publications until he was executed by followers of O'Higgins in
Mendoza in 1821. 111
Following the fall of Carrera in Chile and the fiasco of the "Expedici6n chiquita,"
Poinsett refused a second mission to South America in 1817. In an untitled letter from
Charleston, Poinsett explained his decision. "I never will again leave America in a
subaltern capacity or as an unauthorized agent of the Government; but if the U.S. resolve
to espouse the cause of our Brethren of the South, and I should be thought worthy to
contribute towards so glorious an end, there is no sacrifice I think too great. I am ready to
108 Jose Miguel Carrera, "A los habitants de los pueblo en Chile," in La Imprenta Federal del General Jose
Miguel Carrera, 1818-1820, ed. Guillermo Feliu Cruz (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1966),
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promote the cause of Freedom by every exertion in my powers.,,112 He went on to
compare Carrera with O'Higgins: "Our friend [Carrera] ... possesses more intellect and
more vigor of Character and I think is the only man I knew there capable of carrying the
revolution to a successful termination, but his Republicanism was due to my ascendant
over him and I found on that subject he was difficult to govern."ll3 His mission in Chile
had been unsuccessful. The leader he supported only learned the superficial lessons of
republicanism, and ended up marginalized, exiled and executed. The United States' rival,
Great Britain, emerged victorious and dominant in the region. Poinsett fled Chile without
the trade agreements and hemispheric influence he sought, but his experiences in South
America prepared him for future endeavors. After he returned from Chile, Poinsett turned
his attention to domestic matters, serving as a South Carolinian congressman until he was
elected to the United States Congress in 1820. 114 He would serve in Congress until he
again undertook diplomatic service, this time in Mexico.
112 Henry Bartholomew Cox, "Reasons for Joel R. Poinsett's Refusal of a Second Mission to South
America," Hispanic American Historical Review 43, no. 3 (1963): 405-408.
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CHAPTER III
IMPERIAL REPUBLICANISM:
JOEL POINSETT AND MEXICO
Poinsett's experiences in Chile taught him valuable lessons that he applied to his
diplomatic work in Mexico during the I820s. He did not forsake the symbols of
republicanism, the flags and national holidays, or the tangible aspects of sovereignty,
such as the press and constitutions, but his goals were different, as were the conditions he
faced. u.s. priorities in Mexico were more explicitly territorial and expansionist. The
United States wanted more than just preferential trade agreements with the new Mexican
nation; the U.S. hoped to gain the Northern Mexican state of Texas. Although
hemispheric republicanism had adherents in Mexico, Poinsett faced many skeptics who
claimed that his rhetoric and ideology were merely distractions from United States'
imperial intentions. Poinsett's developing strategy of imperial republicanism responded
to the changing nature of his national self-interest and integrated the lessons he learned in
Chile. He embraced the promotion of republican rights and guarantees, while also
cultivating the economic and social connections that had worked in Great Britain's favor
in Chile. Poinsett again competed with British diplomats who sought favorable trade
agreements with the Mexican government. Poinsett chose his allies in Mexico carefully,
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bolstering their political power and cooperation through overlapping networks of
fraternal, political, business and land interests.
In 1821, after several punishing years of warfare, Mexico emerged as an
independent nation recognized for the vast territory and extensive natural resources
contained within its far-flung borders. Augustin Iturbide, a royalist officer that originally
fought to maintain Spanish claims to Mexico, later changed allegiance, and joined
Vicente Guerrero. Guerrero, the heroic general who had fought with Jose Maria Morelos
a decade before, was known for his opposition to racial and social distinctions. Together
they formed the Army of the Three Guarantees, and led the Mexican independence
movement to victory. 115 Soon after declaring independence, Iturbide seized power, and
declared Mexico an Empire and himself Emperor. The Monroe administration sent
Poinsett to Mexico in 1822 to compile information on the empire under Iturbide. His
report included census data, economic information, military preparedness, and resource
estimation. 116 During his first stay in Mexico, Poinsett met with a minister to Emperor
Iturbide, named Francisco Azcarate. Azcarate later reported that Poinsett had traced his
finger across a map of Northern Mexico, indicating his desire to see his own nation's
territory include all Texas, New Mexico, and Upper California, and parts of Lower
California, Sonora, Coahuila, and Nuevo Le6n. 1l7 Poinsett's suggestion of the ideal U.S.-
115 The Three Guarantees were: independence from Spain, the protection of religion and Church privileges,
and the equality or unity of Creoles and peninsulares. See Michael C. Meyer, William L. Sherman, and
Susan Deeds, The Course ofMexican History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),283-84.
116 Poinsett/Smith pg vii-vii, Unpublished Report.
117 William Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1916),289.
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Mexican border was not officially sanctioned, but was reflective of the uncertain
relationship between the Mexican Empire and the United States, and the ambition ofD.S.
political leaders. 118
During his trip to Mexico, Poinsett also recorded his experiences in journal form,
a travelogue published in 1823 under the title of Notes on Mexico, Made in the Autumn of
1822. Poinsett's book offered the reading public his reflections on Mexican politics,
society, environment, culture, and recent history. Notes on Mexico included transcripts of
Iturbide's speeches and congressional meetings, and reflected Poinsett's admiration for
members of the opposition to Iturbide. On September 29, 1822, Poinsett remarked on
Iturbide's recent arrest of oppositional members of congress: "[Iturbide] lately got rid of
fourteen or fifteen of the most enlightened members of the congress by accusing them of
being involved in a conspiracy against the government."U9 Poinsett wrote, "I am ignorant
whether they be guilty or not. If the character I have received of them be correct, they are
probably guilty; for what noble and generous mind will endure patiently to see his
country enslaved, and not make the effort to liberate it, and to destroy a usurper and
tyrantl,,120 Poinsett advised Monroe against recognizing the Empire, writing in his official
report that it would give Emperor Iturbide an advantage over the politicians who
118 The attempt to absorb Mexican territory occurred within a larger context ofD.S. ambitions, including
the Louisiana Purchase, and the acquisition of Florida.
119 Joel Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, Made in the Autumn of1822 (New York: Praeger, 1969),71-72.
120 Joel Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, 71-72.
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supported republicanism. 121 He communicated his impression that "the Mexican people
were not more unanimous for the declaration of their independence, than they are for the
establishment of a liberal, constitutional, and republican form of government."122 He had
become aware of the considerable economic and agricultural potential of the Mexican
countryside and a republican-minded political faction in Mexico. Within the oppositional
faction of idealistic and educated men, Poinsett met his most important collaborator in
Mexico, Lorenzo de Zavala. 123
Lorenzo de Zavala was a dissident intellectual from Yucatan. He played an
important role in the Mexican independence movement as a writer, journalist, and critic,
and he later contributed to the efforts to replace Iturbide's empire with a republican
government. As a youth, Zavala expressed anti-monarchical views. In 1813, he edited El
arisarco universal, or Universal Critique, a newspaper critical of the Spanish Crown. 124
Zavala was imprisoned for three years for his opposition to colonial rule. He was released
in 1817 and elected as a member of congress under Emperor Iturbide in 1822. His
condemnation of Mexico's turn toward empire matched Poinsett's. Zavala condemned
Iturbide's imprisonment of the oppositional congressmen that Poinsett had visited in
confinement. Zavala eventually helped negotiate a compromise between congress and the
121 Joel Poinsett, The Present State ofMexico: A Previously Unpublished Confidential Report ofthe
Political Condition ofMexico in 1822, Preparedfor the Us. Secretary ofState (Salisbury, NC:
Documentary Publications, 1822), 17.
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Emperor. 125 Zavala outlasted Iturbide, who abdicated his throne in 1823 in the face of
overwhelming opposition. Zavala gained power in the Mexican Congress, and along with
other educated and liberal Creoles, shaped pivotal governmental policies on colonization,
policies that allowed almost unchecked settlement potential in Texas. 126 In 1824, Zavala
was the "principal architect" of the Mexican constitution, and opposed a centralized form
of government, arguing that giving more power to state governments would give more
power to the Mexican'people. 127 Zavala continued his involvement with newspaper
publication, editing the Aguila Mexicana in 1823 and the Correa de fa Federacion in
1826, using these platforms to call for democratic reforms that extended political liberties
to all Mexicans. 128 Zavala and the other Mexican dissidents to Iturbide's imperial project
impressed Poinsett. Under the conditions of Iturbide's rule, Poinsett did not recommend
that President Monroe formally recognize the Empire of Mexico.
Poinsett retuned to the United States with no indication that Emperor Iturbide
sympathized with the expansionist ambitions of the U.S., but he had established an
understanding of the political tension and economic potential in Mexico. Contrary to
Poinsett's recommendations, President Monroe recognized the legitimacy ofIturbide's
government that same year. 129 Once forced from power in 1823, Iturbide was exiled by
125 Henson, Lorenzo de Zavala, 21.
126 Henson, Lorenzo de Zavala, 21.
127 John-Michael Rivera, "'A Complete Though Bloody Victory': Lorenzo de Zavala and the Transnational
Paradoxes of National Sovereignty," American Literary History 18, no. 3 (2006): 431-432.
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members of a political coalition called the Escoceses. 130 The powerful, conservative
group was comprised of priests, politicians and generals who not only led the opposition
to Iturbide, but also belonged to the Scotch Rite Masonic Lodge. The fraternal
association coalesced into a political party known as The Scotch, or Escoceses. Originally
the locations of dissent, by 1825 the lodges were the now the sites of the party in power.
Once on power, the Escoceses lacked an overtly republican agenda. Instead, the
government led by President Guadalupe Victoria was sympathetic to European
monarchical influences, and supported the privileged landed elite, the authority ofthe
Catholic Church, and a centrist form of government. l3l
In 1825, Poinsett was sent to back to Mexico, this time in the official capacity of
United States Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, or ambassador. As he had in
Chile, he presented himself as a representative of republican ideology and policy, while
he pursued imperial goals. Again he was instructed to foster American political values
and negotiate trade agreements with a young republic. Superficially, the directions he was
given resembled his goals in South America, a decade or so before. Henry Clay, the
Secretary of State, told Poinsett:
The mission on which the President wishes you, with all
practicable dispatch, to depart, would, at any time, be
highly important, but possesses, at this moment, a peculiar
interest ...You are the first minister actually leaving the
United States, to reside near a Sovereign Power established
and exerted on this continent, whose territories are
130 Stanley C. Green, The Mexican Republic, the First Decade, 1823-1832 (Pittsburgh: The University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1987),35-41.
131 Richard Warren, Vagrants and Citizens: Politics and the Masses in Mexico City from Colony to
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coterminous with our own...But what gives, with the
President, to your Mission, peculiar importance, at this time
is that it has, for the first its principle object, to lay, for the
first time, the foundations of an intercourse of amity
commerce, navigation and neighborhood, which may exert
a powerful influence, for a long period upon the prosperity
of both States. 132
However, Poinsett was given another assignment that was explicitly territorial-
the renegotiation of the border between Mexico and the United States and the purchase of
the Mexican state of Texas. Clay warned Poinsett of the possible implications of border
renegotiation, saying that "some difficulties may possibly hereafter arise between the two
countries from the line thus agreed upon... the President wishes you to sound [the
Mexican government] on that subject, and to avail yourself of a favorable disposition, if
you should find it, to effect that object.,,133 Clay went on to suggest borders based on
different geographical features, other than the Sabine River that had served to demarcate
the line between Mexico and the United States: "The line of the Sabine approaches our
great western mart nearer than could be wished.,,134
Poinsett set about bolstering his connections to powerful Mexican statesmen with
inclinations toward pursuing a republican form of government in Mexico, and closer ties
with the United States. His closest friend and collaborator was Zavala, one of the liberal,
132Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 229.
133 Clay to Poinsett, March 25, 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 6, 580.
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politically active Mexicans whom Poinsett had met in 1822. 135 Zavala had spent the years
since Poinsett's 1822 departure from Mexico integrating actual elements of
republicanism into Mexican society. Like Poinsett, Zavala understood the importance of
a free press, had been directly involved in several newspaper publications, and was well-
read in the works of republican philosophers like Locke, Jefferson and Rousseau. 136
Zavala had worked with discretion as the Escoceses consolidated their power, and
avoided alienating the party, or abandoning his principles. Zavala's republican credentials
were further bolstered by his record of supporting public education, opposing slavery,
and encouraging robust public debate to protect the integrity and transparency of
government. 137 Through their public friendship and collaboration, Poinsett attached his
own interests to Zavala's reputation as a progressive intellectual heavy-weight committed
to republican principles.
Poinsett had learned that concrete products of republican philosophy, like
freedom of the press and constitutional guarantees, while essential, were not sufficient to
fulfill his instructions. Particularly worrisome to Poinsett was the fact that Great Britain
had already established friendly relations with the Victoria government. Poinsett engaged
in a rivalry with the British Charges, George Canning and Henry Ward. Poinsett
described how this rivalry centered on the desire for preferential trade agreements with
the Mexican government, in a letter to Rufus King, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain,
135 Henson, Lorenzo de Zavala, 28.
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dated October 10, 1825, saying that the relationship between Mexico and Great Britain
was interfering with his mission. "The difficulties I had encountered in my negotiations
with this government," Poinsett wrote, "all arose out of their pre-existing (trade) treaty
with Great Britain.,,138 Poinsett went on to say that he had never confused Great Britain
with "the powers of Europe that are hostile to the independence and liberties of these
countries," but instead had "considered her interests identified with ours." 139 Poinsett
further explained his concern that the rivalry between himself and the British diplomats
signified Great Britain's indifference, or even hostility to, republican and free-trade
ideology. "I. ..came here disposed to make common cause with her envoy for the
extension of liberal principles of trade for the mutual protection of our industry and
capital," Poinsett wrote, "but if Great Britain seeks to divide these countries, or destroy
the principles of republican government which are taking root in these countries ...her
ministers must not complain if we exert all our influence to counteract their views.,,140
For Poinsett, Freemasonry provided the venue he sought. In order to understand how the
American ambassador was able to establish himself in Mexico and form lasting alliances
with Mexican leaders, this chapter will now examine the Masonic and political networks
of which Poinsett was a part.
Within months of arriving in Mexico City, Poinsett hosted a meeting in his home,
and invited Zavala and several of his political allies. General Vicente Guerrero, the
138 William Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence ofthe United States Concerning the Independence ofthe
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widely popular hero of the independence wars also attended, as did like-minded priests
and politicians. Poinsett requested a charter from the South Carolinian Master Lodge, and
formally organized the York Rite Lodge, or Yorkinos in Mexico City. 141 In a letter to
Rufus King on October 14, 1825, Poinsett described his role in the organization of the
Yorkinos and his hopes that the lodge would foster liberal governmental policies. "With a
view to counteract the fanatical party in this city (Mexico), and, if possible, to diffuse
more liberal principles among those who must govern this country," Poinsett wrote, "I
encouraged and assisted a number of respectable persons, men of high rank and
consideration, to form a grand lodge of ancient Masons.,,142
The Yorkino lodges multiplied rapidly. Zavala reported that 80 Yorkino Lodges
opened in Mexico City in three months, and other reports indicate the presence of
Yorkino lodges in every state in Mexico by the end of the decade. 143 Poinsett's assistant,
Edward Tayloe, described the rise of the Yorkinos in a letter to his brother on November
29, 1825, crediting Poinsett with assisting a number of leading Mexican statesmen to start
a party that would advance the nation. "Freemasonry... flourishes greatly (in the capital),
and numbers among members the first men of the country and several influential
priests ...No greater proof can be adduced of the progressing improvement of the country.
141 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 76-77.
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And to this ... our minister has given strong aid.,,144 His expectation that Yorkino
institutions would sow the seeds of political improvement and liberal progress seemed
well founded. As the Yorkinos gained political power, they increased popular
involvement in politics, pursued a federalist form of government modeled after the
United States, and worked to minimize the economic and political clout of the Catholic
Church and members of the Spanish-born elite. 145 Ward described the Yorkinos to
Charles Vaughan, the British diplomat in Washington D.C. very differently than Tayloe:
"You can have no idea, my dear Vaughan, of the sort of men with whom the Yorkinos
have sought to fill their ranks: half-pay officers, clerks in public offices, petty advocates,
clergymen who are reduced to seek, by an affectation of liberal views, that promotion
which their characters prevented them from obtaining before. Such are the elements of
which the New York lodges are composed.,,146
The Yorkinos were a lodge in form, but a political party in function, and its
founding members were important national figures, senators, generals, and priests who
used their lodges as effective political organizations. The Masonic language of
brotherhood and tolerance brought together a coalition of members, ardent republicans,
pro-United States politicians, and even disgruntled former Iturbidists. The secrecy of the
lodges encouraged open debate and oppositional views. The power of the Escoceses also
indicated that political masonry was an avenue to political authority, a fact that may have
144 Edward Tayloe, Mexico, 1825-1828: The Journal and Correspondence (Chapel Hill, NC: The North
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enabled an alliance between men with a variety of viewpoints. The ideology of masonry,
focusing on fratemalloyalties, equality among members, and adherence to Masonic code
supported the Yorkino coalition. Masonic Lodges were often the locations of connection
and exchange, providing a safe venue for dangerous ideas, a neutral meeting-ground for
educated men, and a stable organizational structure that gave freemasons a sound basis
for a political organization. Tolerant of all monotheistic religions, committed to free
thought, and deeply influenced by Enlightenment theories of natural rights and
constitutionalism, in many ways masonry manifested republicanism. 147 Yet the two
Masonic associations in Mexico were bitter rivals.
The animosity between the lodges was a public affair, as each lodge (or political
party) had its own newspaper. The Escoceses had been publishing a newspaper, El Sol,
since 1821. 148 In 1826, the Yorkinos began publishing a rival newspaper edited by Zavala,
El Aguila Mexicana. The two parties used the periodicals to challenge and attack one
another. 149 The Escoceses and the Yorkinos engaged in partisanship and propaganda as
the 1826 Congressional elections neared, and El Sol and El Aguila each sought to
convince their readers of their respective party's legitimacy. El Sol linked Yorkinos to
Jacobins and "leperos," or members of Mexico's urban lower classes, and accused them
147 Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons, and Republicans (New York:
George Allen & Unwin, 1981),20-27.
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of violence and fraud. I50 In so doing, the paper roused suspicions of a secretive group of
men manipulating the votes of Mexico City's urban lower classes, and evoked images of
the terror that followed the French Revolution. This fit in with Escoceses ' accusations
that Zavala was escorting vagrants to polling places for the 1826 elections. 151 This charge
was expressed on one occasion through a fanciful dialogue, published in El Sol, between
a merchant and a barber. The merchant described how prominent Yorkinos gave poor
men, or leperos, money to vote. 152 The potential for Yorkinos to both unleash and control
the new political power of Mexico's masses unnerved their opponents.
El Aguila, under Zavala's direction, sought to galvanize both nationalism and
republicanism, urging the Mexican government to adhere to the constitution and pursue
"liberty for the republic." The newspaper supported the Yorkino proposition that the
nation's first commemoration of Mexican independence should occur on the night of
September 15, instead of the following day, as the Victoria government planned. 153 The
significance of the date and format of the nationalistic celebration was not lost on the
editors of the paper, or the political parties they represented. Symbols of nationalism and
the details that governed them (the dates and manners in which national memory was
commemorated) were valuable and necessary tools for building legitimate claims to
political authority. The Yorkinos, and their newspaper El Aguila, publicly chastised the
150 El Sol, No. 1171, August 28, 1826.
151 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 81.
152 El Sol, No. 1171, August 28, 1826.
153 Warren, Citizens and Vagrants, 77.
54
Escoceses and El Sol over the timing and format of the nationalist event. They demanded
that the celebration last through the night, and be accessible and inviting to all classes of
Mexicans. The Yorkinos prevailed and the celebration went as they had recommended. ls4
Poinsett and Tayloe attended the celebration of Mexican independence, and Tayloe wTote
a letter to his parents describing the stirring fireworks display that the Yorkinos had
arranged, and the "allegorical paintings of independence," and the "patriotic songs" that
had stirred the crowd. ISS
Due to the surge in lower-class political involvement, at least thirty thousand
votes were cast in the 1826 Congressional election, twenty-three times more than the
number of votes cast in the previous presidential election. IS6 The election was a
significant victory for the Yorkinos, and they gained a majority in the legislature. Tayloe
described the election in a letter to his brother, with an air of naivete. "August 20, 1826,
this is election day. The contest is spirited between several parties. Strange as it may
appear, two are distinguished by masonic names-Yorkinos and Escoceses," Tayloe
wrote, "The Yorks are the federalists, who are liberals, and friends to the existing federal
constitution. This party is gaining ascendancy throughout the republic. Their opponents-
the Scotch-are composed of Centralists, Bourbonists, and Monarchists.,,157 The political
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party that was first organized in Poinsett's home had soon become ascendant advocates
of the United States' model of federalist, anti-monarchical republicanism.
The Yorkinos' political ascendancy rested on greatly expanded suffrage and high
voter turn-out in the Mexico City metropolis. Unleashed by independence, popular
involvement in politics was becoming a powerful social force and a vehicle for national
identity; the Yorkinos effectively used their Masonic network to draw in members.
Although the Yorkino lodge was an exclusive institution with prohibitively high dues, it
became known as the "people's party," for newly politicized, non-elite, groups.158 This
ability to exist as both an exclusive organization and a beacon of equality was a particular
strength of freemasonry that served the Yorkinos well, especially as the election neared
and the voting power of lower-class Mexicans grew exponentially.
With control of the Mexican legislature, the Yorkinos endeavored to increase
popular support and political power in preparation for the 1828 presidential election.
Their ability to act as a conduit for republican ideology and liberal progress was
compromised by their rivalry with the Escoceses, the growing suspicion in Mexico
towards the secrecy of freemasonry, and the intentions of the United States of America.
Yorkinos courted Mexican voters with an effective mixture of nativism and popular
initiatives.159 One of the Yorkinos' most controversial acts of legislation was the first
expulsion of native born Spaniards, or peninsulares, from Mexico. 160 By targeting the
158 Green, The Mexican Republic, 94.
159 Harold Dana Sims, The Expulsion ofMexico's Spaniards, 1821-1836 (pittsburgh: The Pittsburgh
University Press, 1990), 27.
160 Sims, The Expulsion ofMexico's Spaniards, 27-28.
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peninsulares, the Yorkinos capitalized on widespread resentment of the continued wealth
and influence of the elite group, and also emphasized the Escoceses' affiliation with the
Spaniards.
In 1827, the inter-masonic rivalry between the Yorkinos and the Escoceses
became more tangible and immediate with the discovery of the conspiracy of Escoces
priest, Father Joaquin Arenas. 161 Arenas plotted with Spanish emigres to prepare for the
Spanish re-invasion ofthe nation and the simultaneous attacks on the cities of: Mexico,
Puebla, Tehuantepec, Acapulco, Durango Cuemavaca, and Tampico. 162 A new, more
radical Yorkino newspaper, El Correo de la Federacion incited anti-Spanish sentiment
and invasion fears by reporting extensively on the failed conspiracy. 163 Now on the
defensive in the contest for public approval, El Sol implicated Poinsett in the scandal,
reporting rumors that a letter he had written was found among Arenas' belongings. 164
This rumor was never substantiated, but whether or not Poinsett arranged the failed
conspiracy in order to discredit the Escoceses, El Sol's accusation illustrates the
complexity of the situation in which he had emerged himself, and the way his political
enemies perceived his involvement in Mexican factionalism.
The Yorkinos benefited from the conspiracy plot. As the presidential election
approached, the Escoceses became increasingly associated with the threat of the Spanish
161 Jorge Fernando Iturribarr1a, "La conspiraci6n del Padre Arenas," Humanitas 1, no. 1 (1960): 517-523.
162 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 82.
163 EI Correo de la Federaci6n, June 2-6, 1827.
164 EI Sol, January 23, 1827.
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designs on the nation and the duplicity of pro-monarchical politicians. However, the
entire affair also raised suspicions of all secret societies in Mexico and their capacity for
conspiracy and treason. Poinsett was regarded by many Mexicans as an imperial
interloper with designs on Mexico's northern territory, and came under attack for his role
in organizing the York lodge and his influence on prominent Yorkinos. 165 Zavala,
Poinsett's closest Mexican associate, published a defense of Poinsett's activities and
republican credentials, describing Poinsett's anti-monarchical beliefs and decrying the
aristocratic and anti-republican positions of his critics. Zavala provided his readers with a
brief description of Poinsett's "defense of liberty" in Chile, and included letters Poinsett
had exchanged with his revolutionary associates there. 166
Conflicts between the two parties intensified as the 1828 presidential election
neared. 167 The Yorkino candidate Vicente Guerrero was a widely celebrated General of
the Wars of Independence, popular with the poor and rumored to be of part indigenous
and part African ancestry.168 He opposed monarchy, advocated racial equality, social
leveling, and republican government,169 Tayloe described Guerrero in a letter to his
brother in July 1827, predicting the hero and leader of the Yorkino party would be
165 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 82.
166 Lorenzo de Zavala, Manifiesto de los principios politicos del Escmo. Sr. D.J.R. Poinsett (Mexico City:
Impr. del Correo, 1828),2-3.
167 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 87.
168 Theodore G. Vincent, Vicente Guerrero, Mexico's First Black Indian President (Gainesville, FL:
University of Florida Press, 2001), 8-12.
169 Theodore G. Vincent, "The Contributions of Mexico's First Black Indian President, Vicente Guerrero,"
The Journal o/Negro History 86, 2 (Spring, 2001): 148-159.
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Mexico's next president. "He was from the first most ardent in the cause of Mexican
liberty...He is a man of strong natural powers," wrote Tayloe, "He received very little
education, and speaks the language of the Indians ...he is said to have some African
blood.,,170 Guerrero's racial heritage and his ties to indigenous communities inspired hope
and loyalty in many Mexicans. Ifliberty and virtue were the true measure of a republican,
many believed Guerrero offered both to the nation. l7l Not only had he fought the
authority of the Spanish monarchy, but he continued to identify his own interests with the
greater good of the Mexican people.
Surprisingly, Guerrero's opponent, Manuel G6mez·Pedraza, won the August 1828
presidential election. The results of the election were contested and violent upheavals and
organized uprisings undermined his government. Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna started
an armed uprising to protest the results of the election. I72 Widespread suspicion of fraud
galvanized Guerrero's lower-class supporters. Santa Anna led troops to the capital to
support Guerrero, and Guerrero's urban followers mobilized, demanding their Yorkino
candidate take office. 173 After days ofuprising and protest, the wealthy Spanish
merchants of the Parian marketplace were financially devastated. 174 Poinsett supported
170 Tayloe, Mexico, 1825-1828,158-159.
171 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 80-81; 87.
172 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens,89.
173 Vincent, Vicente Guerrero, 173.
174 Silvia ArroID, "Popular Politics in Mexico City: The Parian Riot, 1828," Hispanic American Review 68,
no. 2 (May, 1988): 257-262. In her analysis of the political nature of the riots, historian Sylvia ArroID
reveals the links between the violence of the riots to the rhetoric published in the Yorkino newpaper, Ef
Correo de fa Federacion, that decried the wealth and corruption of the parianistas, and the rioters' loyalty
to Guerrero and the Yorkino party.
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Guerrero's claim to the executive position, but distanced himself from the violent nature
of Mexico's change in government. Poinsett's involvement in the riot was later described
by Charlestonian admirers in an 1833 publication, focusing on his heroic resolve in the
face of chaos:
Mr. Poinsett, with his Secretary of Legation, Mr. John
Mason, Jr., threw themselves into an open balcony which
overlooked the crowd, and unfurling the STAR-
SPANGLED BANNER, demanded that all persons in his.
house should be protected while the flag of his country
waved over them. The scene changed as by enchantment;
and the very men who were about to make the attack,
cheered the Standard of our Union, and placed sentinels to
guard it from outrage. The history of the world presents no
parallel to such a scene: and its moral beauty and grandeur
should be equally preserved on the page of the historian
and the canvass of the painter. 175
El Sol implicated Zavala and Poinsett in the uprising, accusing them of
orchestrating the riots and unrest in order to steal the presidency for Guerrero and the
Yorkino party.176 A British pamphlet published after Guerrero assumed the presidency
accused Poinsett and Zavala of manipulating Mexican politics. 177 The unnamed author
(perhaps Ward) accused Poinsett of being "interested in keeping Mexico in confusion,"
and able, through his "mild and polished manners ... information and wit. .. amiable
character and the republicanism he displays" to covertly manipulate Mexican politics and
175 Committee for a National Painting, "Solicitation by William Drayton, Daniel E. Huger, Benjamin F.
Pepoon" (Charleston: Ephemera Collection, 1833), Portfolio 46, Folder 46.
176 Green, The Mexican Republic, 162.
177 Joel Poinsett, Mexico and Mr. Poinsett: A Reply to a British Pamphlet (Philadelpia: s.n., 1829),9.
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sabotage the young nation. I78 In a response to the pamphlet, Poinsett defended Zavala
against charges that he organized the coup, calling him "the earliest friend" that he had in
Mexico, and objecting to the "cruel and unjust persecution" to which he was subjected. 179
Poinsett's British critics saw his involvement with Mexican politics through freemasonry
and his alliance with Zavala as disruptive and unethical. The British author recognized
that the trappings of republicanism gave Poinsett an air of legitimacy in his interactions
with his Mexican associates, but also veiled an imperial agenda.
Suspicion of American aggression and distrust of Poinsett grew within Mexico,
particularly in the state of Veracruz, a stronghold of the Escoceses. El Sol published
editorials and pamphlets claiming that Poinsett used masonic networks to pursue imperial
intentions. Ramon Gamboa, an Escoces from Veracruz, published a scathing review of
Poinsett's activities on August 3, 1829, accusing him of political masonry and national
self-interest. Gamboa called Poinsett the "author of all that was evil," and charged
Poinsett with using his influence on the Yorkinos in the government to destabilize Mexico
and tum the republic into a "political labyrinth" in order to take Texas for the United
States. 180 This criticism exemplified growing escoces condemnation of Poinsett's
178 Poinsett, Mexico and Mr. Poinsett, 9.
179 Poinsett, Mexico and Mr. Poinsett, 9.
180 Gamboa, Representaci6n del ciudadano sfndico , 8.
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imperial designs on Mexico's northern state and the danger political masonry posed to
Mexico's national sovereignty. 181
Yorkino policies in the late 1820s fueled suspicions that the political organization
was not only problematic because it was based on a secretive and exclusive fraternal
organization, but also because the Yorkinos awarded many of their fellows with
empresario grants that gave them rights to wide swathes ofthe states of Texas and
Coahuila. 182 The permissive colonization policy that Zavala had crafted in 1823 allowed
Yorkinos to seek and receive large land grants. The land grant-holders or Empresarios,
only achieved ownership of the parcels of land they controlled if they were successfully
settled by colonists willing to assimilate to Mexican culture. Most settlers in Texas came
from the United States, where land companies advertised the agricultural and economic
possibilities in the Mexican state. 183 A letter from Henry Ward, the British diplomat in
Mexico, to Vaughan, the British diplomat in Washington D.C., noted the disproportionate
settlement of Anglo-Americans settling in Texas. "With regard to the encroachment in
Texas," Vaughan wrote to Ward in February of 1826, "It was stated more that 20,000
persons have left the western states of (the United States) for the province of Texas. It
181 The growing condemnation over Poinsett's influence and designs on Texas was formally expressed in
June of 1827 in the Vera Cruz Manifesto, a pamphlet authored by prominent Escoceses who were
demanding Poinsett's expulsion. See Rippy, Joel Poinsett, 123-124.
182 Andres Resendez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2005), 69. Escoceses also held Empresario grants, but not in
the number that Yorkinos and Anglo-Americans did.
183 Elgin Williams, The Animating Pursuits o/Speculation: Land Traffic in the Annexation o/Texas (New
York: Columbia Univerity Press, 1949),39; Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company, Address to the
Readers 0/the Documents Relating to the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company, Trust Deed (New
York: Hopkins and Son, 1831), 1-1 L
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does not seem, however that they have amalgamated well with the old Spanish settlers, as
it is their custom, whenever a crime is to be punished, or dispute to be settled, to send for
ajudge [from the United States].,,184
Zavala and other founding and prominent members of the lodge obtained land
grants after the Yorkinos took office in 1826. 185 Zavala's grant was located in east Texas,
and included the land between the Sabine and Trinity rivers, where Cherokee Indians had
established a community when the Spanish had allowed them to settle before Mexican
independence. 186 The Cherokee community had been allowed to stay in Texas under the
Constitution of 1824. In 1825, Ward encouraged President Victoria to grant land
ownership to the Cherokee. Ward had concerns about the flood of immigrants into Texas
from the United States, and recommended that Victoria use a large Cherokee settlement
in the north as a buffer against U.S. influx. Ward advised Victoria to give the Cherokee
chief, John Deerhunter, a land grant in exchange for settling 30,000 Cherokees in the
area. Poinsett, "who apparently had the ear of those in power," discouraged the Congress
from granting the Cherokee pennanent land ownership.18? While the Cherokee never
attained land ownership in Texas, Zavala's land claim remained valid. Poinsett's own
feelings about the Texas region were implied in an encoded dispatch he sent to Henry
184 Vaughan, The Papers o/Sir Charles Vaughan, 325.
185 The connections between Masonic membership and Texas land grants were pervasive, and "more than
half of all land grants in Mexican Texas were awarded to Anglo-American, Mexican, and Native American
Masons, while the proportions of Masons within the population of Texas at large was less than ten
percent." See Andres Resendez, Changing National Identities, 68.
186 Dianna Everett, The Texas Cherokee: A People between Two Fires, 1819-1940 (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1990),20
187 Everett, The Texas Cherokee, 41.
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Clay at the beginning of his diplomatic service: "We ought to have on the frontier a hardy
race of white settlers," he wrote of the borderlands. 188 Yorkino colonization policies in
Texas enabled this goal, in part by denying land ownership to the Cherokees, and instead
encouraging Anglo-Saxon immigration. 189
Moreover, the Yorkino's political ideology of federalism made the Mexican
hinterlands vulnerable to isolation and secession, by weakening their bonds to the
metropolitan center. Federalism decentralized power and gave states like Texas and
Coahuila greater autonomy. 190 Over the course of the late 1820s, ties between Texans and
Mexico City loosened. The state government of Texas had already established a policy
that encouraged settlement, in the hopes that self-reliant and entrepreneurial Texans
would develop the region for Mexico. Instead, the primarily Anglo-American settlers
retained cultural and economic ties to the United States. As the Yorkinos became more
popular their federalist policies were implemented, and Yorkinos in power in the Texan
state legislature entered into business arrangements preferential to the United States. An
escoces clergyman, Ramos Arizpe traveling in Texas in 1828 described the situation:
I visited the capital of the state of Coahuila and Texas and
was dismayed to learn that due to the inconceivable
stupidity of three successive yorkino legislatures, the
exclusive rights to navigate the Rio Grand on a steamboat
were given to a company promoted by Anglo-Americans
and supported by capitalists of their republic ...This
188 United States, Despatchesfrom United States Ministers to Mexico, roll 3.
189 Andres Resendez, "Masonic Connections, Pecuniary Interests, and Institutional Development along
Mexico's Far North," The Divine Charter: Constitutionalism and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century
Mexico, ed. Jaime E. Rodriguez (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005), Ill.
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disastrous policy in effect puts the line that North
Americans have long coveted as the limit of their own
territory in the hands of individuals and capitalists from the
United State. 191
Dissatisfaction with Yorkino settlement policies added to the growing chorus denouncing
their political power and the presidency of their leader, Vicente Guerrero. Noted historian
Andres Resendez has observed that "the predominance of Anglo-American Empresarios
in Texas constituted one of the main rifts between the Escoceses and the Yorkinos."l92
Guerrero's presidency was brief. During his time in control of the executive
branch, he abolished slavery in Mexico, codifying the commitment to social leveling he
had shared with Morelos. In a speech in April, 1829, Guerrero promised to work to
"procure the widest possible benefits and apply them from the palace of the rich to the
wooden shack of the humble laborer.,,193 He went on to assert "if one can succeed in
spreading the guarantees of the individual, if the equity before the law destroys the
effects of power and gold, if the highest title between us is citizen, if the rewards we
bestow are exclusively for talent and virtue, we have a republic, and she will be
conserved by the universal suffrage of a people sold, free, and happy.,,194 His presidency
left an ambiguous legacy, however, stigmatized by his coup de etat, Poinsett's influence,
and the broken state of the Mexican treasury. 195 The exaggerated reports of bloodshed at
191 Quoted by Resendez, Changing National Identities, 67-68.
192 Resendez, "Masonic Connections," 114.
193 El Correo, Apri14, 1829; Vincent, Vicente Guerrero, 179.
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the Parian riots and the Acordada Revolt created a backlash against expanded suffrage. 196
The Yorkinos lost power quickly, public opinion turned against masonic involvement in
Mexican politics, and Poinsett's influence on Guerrero became increasingly
problematic.197 Guerrero requested Poinsett's recall from Mexico late in 1829, and
Poinsett left the country soon after Christmas. 198 Guerrero was removed from power the
next year, and later captured and executed by agents of the subsequent, conservative,
centrist regime led by Anastasio Bustamante. 199
Unlike Guerrero, Zavala withstood the Yorkinos' fall from power. Zavala left
Mexico for the United States in 1830, not long after Poinsett returned home.2oo Also in
1830, Zavala went into the land speculation business with David Burnet and a wealthy
German investor named Joseph Vehlein, the two holders ofland grants adjacent to
Zavala's own in Texas. Together with Northern investors, they formed The Galveston
Bay and Texas Land Company.201 In the book he wrote that year, Journey to the United
States ofNorth America, Zavala described his role in the formation of the land company.
"One of the first things that I did when I arrived in New York was to bring about the
formation of a company... relative to colonizing the lands that lie between the Sabine
196 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 91.
197 Warren, Vagrants and Citizens, 93.
198 Rippy, Joel Poinsett, 128.
199 Vincent, Vicente Guerrero, 204-205.
200 Lorenzo de Zavala, Journey to the United States ofNorth America (Austin: Shoal Creek Publishers, Inc.,
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River, Galveston Bay, the town ofNacogdoches and the sea," wrote Zavala, "My
enemies in Mexico had many disagreeable remarks to make considering this action...they
said that I had sold a part of Texas to the United States.,,202 Zavala entered into a contract
with Poinsett, giving Poinsett the authority to seek investors of the land company.203
Zavala and his Empresario partners awarded control of a parcel of the Galveston Bay and
Land Company's acreage to Poinsett. Poinsett's stake in the land speculation company
was bordered by the Sabine and San Jacinto rivers. 204
On April 6, 1830, following a report from General Mier y Teran's Boundary
Commission, the Mexican government passed a law banning further Anglo-American
immigration into Texas.2°5 The rift between centrists and federalists over the "Texas
question" and the suspicions of Anglo-American land speculation led to further political
unrest. 206 During the early l830s, federalist and centralist governments in Mexico
replaced one another in quick succession.2°7 Northern states, particularly Texas, viewed
the unstable central government with suspicion. In 1834, Jose Antonio Vasquez, the
representative of Monclova, told his community that "The City of Mexico, that
202 Zavala, Journey to the United States, 95-96.
203 Henson, Lorenzo de Zavala, 42-46.
204 Zavala, Journey to the United States, 119; Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company and Joel Poinsett,
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inexhaustible volcano of revolutions, has shaken the whole nation; it has leveled to its
foundations .. .its liberties, the federal constitution... and its disorganizing vibrations must
necessarily, within a very short time, reach that remote comer of the Republic which you
inhabit.,,208 In contrast to the disorder of Mexico City, Texas was increasingly seen as a
haven of liberty, but one in danger of being subsumed by the unstable center. This view is
reinforced by Texas historian William C. Binkley. In his widely respected 1952 book,
The Texas Revolution, Binkley dismisses both the extension of slavery and the interests
of land speculators as determinates leading up to the Texas Revolution. Binkley instead
finds the sources of the secessionist movement in Texan revolutionaries' attempts to
build a community, protect federalism, and preserve the Mexican constitution of 1824
against the increasingly centrist policies of Mexico City. He also credits the Texans'
"courage, initiative and resourcefulness, combined with their determination to resist
oppression and to maintain their rights," and the certainty and hardiness of Anglo-
American Texans, which "inevitably begot an enthusiasm which no Mexican mind could
comprehend. ,,209 While interest in federalism and republican integrity were certainly
powerful motivators for those who sought Texan independence, the difference in
Mexican and American minds, and their somehow unequal capacities for courage,
resourcefulness, and determination, is a profoundly unsatisfactory and artificial
interpretation of the events leading to Texan secession. The interests of land speculators
208 Quoted in Resendez, Changing National Identities, 154.
209 William C. Binkley, The Texas Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1952),70.
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(including slave-owning planters) and the ideas of Anglo-American racial superiority,
however, are more reasonable components to an explanation of the Texas Revolution.21o
As conflict with the Mexican government increased, the language of
independence became more and more racialized. A noted historian, Reginald Horsman,
historian, observed in his compelling study on the development of race theory, Race and
Manifest Destiny, that "the catalyst in the overt adoption of a racial Anglo-Saxonism was
the meeting of Americans and Mexicans in the Southwest.,,211 Horsman argues that "by
the late 1830s the Americans were eagerly grasping at reasons for their own success and
the failures of others ... White Americans of Jacksonian America wanted personal success
and wealth, they also wanted a clear conscience. If the United States was to remain in the
minds of its people a nation divinely ordained for great deeds, then the fault for the
suffering inflicted in the rise to power and prosperity had to lie elsewhere.,,212 Many
American politicians and Texan settlers referred to the Mexican people as a "mongrel
race," and glorified Anglo-Saxonism?13
The political upheaval in Mexico did not prevent representatives of the Galveston
Bay Company from inviting more settlers to buy permits to settle on their land
210 More current historiography fmds the origins of the Texas Revolution in a combination ofreasons,
primarily the density of Anglo-American population in Texas, broad-based alienation among Anglo and
Mexican Texans from the central government in Mexico City, and Santa Anna's tum toward conservatism
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holdings.214 The Galveston Bay Company was the first commercial effort to colonize
Texas. Agents like Zavala, Sam Houston, General John Mason (the father of Poinsett's
Secretary Legate in Mexico, Colonel Mason), and Poinsett himself sought investors from
the United States and abroad.215 The company recruited settlement through publications
like the Guide to Texas Emigrants, printed in 1834. Settlement permits, or land script,
were given to the Americans who relocated in Texas. Land script did not confer
ownership, but gave settlers the right to fulfill the colonization requirements set by the
Mexican government.216 Land script was often used as legal tender in Texan communities
on the Galveston Bay Company's land, in a precarious informal economy.217 The value
of the script, and more significantly, the value of the parcels of land, was contingent upon
the cooperation of Mexico City. As the 1830s progressed, gaining that cooperation
became less likely. The Mexican government passed increasingly restrictive colonization
policies. As the centralists achieved lasting power in 1834, the allocation of Texas land to
Anglo-Americans provided conservative politicians with an example of the dangers of
liberal colonization laws and federalist policies.218 Were the Mexican government to deny
land ownership to the immigrants that settled on the Galveston Bay Company's parcels,
the land script, and the investments in the company would be rendered worthless. The
214 David Woodman Jr., Guide to Texas Emigrants (Boston: Hawes, 1835), 1-17.
215 Williams, The Animating Pursuits, 42-43.
216 Settler's in Mexico were required to convert to Catholicism, obey Mexican laws. See Resendez,
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218 Resendez, "Masonic Connections," 119.
70
success ofland speculation in Texas depended on securing ownership of that land, yet
Mexico's government demonstrated their inclination to prohibit further American
settlement in Texas and revoke existing American land claims in the region.219 In 1835,
General Mason traveled extensively between Texas and Washington D.C., trying to
arrange a deal that would convince the Mexican government to cede two-thirds of Texas
in exchange for 10 million dollars, but met with no success.220 The Mexican government
refused, and while many in Washington supported annexation possibilities, there also
existed a suspicion among Whigs and free-labor advocates that Texan independence
would further entrench slavery into the Southern economy, and the political
consequences of this domestically221
A letter written by David Burnet to the Galveston Bay Company's trustees
assured his investors of the fertility and beauty of the land, but could not offer assurances
on their relationship with Mexico City.222 The glowing description of Texas served two
goals: attracting settlers and advocating annexation of the region to the United States. The
land company's interest in the political future of Texas was indicated by editorial remarks
that had been published in the National Intelligencer in 1829. These were reprinted in
1834 in the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company's "Guide to Texas Emigrants." The
219 Williams, The Animating Pursuits, 27-28.
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newspaper article called on the United States to annex Texas, and add "this vast province
to our already extended empire.,,223
The relatively dense settlement of Anglo-Americans in Texas both supported and
demanded annexation. In 1835, Stephen F. Austin wrote of the way the "great migration"
ofAnglo-Americans into Texas had increased land value and supplied manpower on the
frontier?24 A year later, he wrote of the urgency of the annexation of Texas to the United
States, and the threat posed by nonwhite Texans to both investment money and the
prosperity of the United States. He warned Senator L.F. Linn that, if Mexico were to
retain sovereignty over Texas "the nucleus of republicanism is to be broken up, and its
place supplied by a population of Indians, Mexicans, and Renegados, all mixed together
and all the natural enemies of white men and civilization.,,225 Not only was annexation
the only protection for republicanism in Texas, but also for all white American
civilization. Sam Houston, while not as inclined to denigrate Mexicans, characterized
Anglo-Americans as ideally chivalrous and superior freedom warriors, fighting against
the despotism perpetuated by Mexicans who would "like the Indian race, yield to the
advance of the North American Population.,,226
223 Woodman Jr., Guide to Texas Emigrants 131-132. Interestingly, the same article connected Poinsett's
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By 1835, the Texan revolutionary movement had begun in earnest. Led by
Empresarios like Austin, Houston, Zavala and Burnet, the call for secession and
annexation increased. Investors in land grant schemes now funded the revolution with
loans to the Texas revolutionaries,z27 Zavala was still connected to Poinsett through their
friendship, ties to the land Galveston Bay Company, and mutual support for Texas
independence. Zavala and Poinsett had remained in communication on the political
developments, and Zavala's decision to move to Texas in 1835. Zavala wrote to Poinsett
soon after he established his residence in San Jacinto, telling him he had decided to
encourage Texas to separate from Mexico, saying it was "impossible for the South of the
Mexican Republic to remain united to the north, where there is a new population.,,228
Austin wrote to Burnet, asking that Burnet greet his friend, Zavala, for him. He expressed
his position on war and annexation to his friend: "We all, as I hope and believe, have but
one object in view, which is the total separation of Texas from Mexico, and its creation
into an independent republic, or its annexation, as a state, to these U. S. of the North.,,229
Texas newspapers connected independence to the rights of Texans and the republican
style of political and social contract they had believed to have undertaken when they
immigrated. For example, the Texas Gazette published an editorial that justified breaking
with Mexico and annexation to the United States: "There can be as little doubt of the
right of Texas to object to the centralism, or consolidation of the government," an article
227 Williams, The Animating Pursuits, 74.
228 Henson, Zavala, the Pragmatic Idealist, 74.
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in the Texas Gazette read on October 26, "Emigrants took lands under a republican
government; and to such only do they owe allegiance ... they are, therefore, fully justified
in separating from the government, and in either declaring their state to be sovereign and
independent, or seeking to be admitted as a member of the United States.'mo Many
Texans supported independence with an understanding of racial superiority and political
supremacy. The developing vocabularies of both ideologies disguised the imperial
aggression implied in the decision of predominantly white American settlers, with
support from many u.s. politicians and businessmen, to occupy Texas and peel the state
away from Mexico.
Zavala's home was very near the site of the battle of San Jacinto where on April
21, 1836, Mexican soldiers led by Santa Anna suffered a brutal and decisive defeat by
Texas revolutionaries. Santa Anna initially escaped capture by hiding in an abandoned
house, but was discovered and taken prisoner the following day. Contrary to popular
accounts in both Mexico and America, Santa Anna's capture was not so much a Wild
West shoot-out as an encounter between members of a fraternal association. Santa Anna
gave the sign of masonic distress, and exchanged the masonic handclasp with Sam
Houston?3! Perhaps when we imagine the drama of this era it would be better to discard
images of rough-hewn men, dressed in greasy chaps and wielding six-shooters, in favor
of frontiersmen wearing Masonic aprons, exchanging secret handshakes, and taking oaths
230 Carol Lee Clark, Imagining Texas: Pre-Revolutionary Texas Newspapers, 1829-1836 (El Paso, TX:
Texas Western Press, 2002), 54.
231 James David Carter, Masonry in Texas (Waco, Texas: Committee on Masonic Education and Service for
the Grand Lodge of Texas, 1955),282-286. Carter bases this anecdote on witness accounts, and the image
it creates fits well with other, more official, sources.
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of international brotherhood. Masomy, land speculation and Texas independence created
connections that spanned national borders, and connected enemies, allies and business
partners. Santa Anna remained loyal to the republic of Mexico, yet Zavala bound his fate
to the interests of the United States, Joel Poinsett and Texan independence. Zavala
became the first Vice-President of the Republic of Texas, serving under Burnet, who was
elected interim president.232 The Galveston Bay Company occupied an important place in
the economy and development of the Republic of Texas, maintaining "a perpetual charter
of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real estate to an unlimited amount...together with
the capacity to monopolize all navigable streams.,,233
What occurred in Texas in the 1830s was in part tied to the actions taken by
Poinsett in Mexico City during the 1820s. Unlike in Chile, Poinsett managed to establish
economic, political, and fraternal connections which produced the capital, power, and
enthusiasm that allowed him to succeed. And if Poinsett's experience in Mexico can be
described as a success from the American point of view, it can be, and was, described as
a disaster from the Mexican point of view. In 1845, a well-known Mexican intellectual
and journalist, Carlos Maria de Bustamante, said of Poinsett's impact on Mexico, "The
astute minister came to mock us, and this resulted thereafter in our ruin.,,234
232 Henson, Zavala The Pragmatic Idealist, 103.
233 Williams, The Animating Pursuits, 166.
234 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Apuntes para la historia del gobierno del General D. Antonio de Santa-
Anna (Mexico DF: Imprenta de lM Lara, 1845), 126.
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CHAPTER IV
RACIALIZED REPUBLICANISM:
JOEL POINSETT AND THE CHEROKEE NATION
Throughout his diplomatic career Poinsett had urged the nations of Spanish
America to implement republican policies and institutions that mirrored the United
States' polity. Even as he pursued an agenda of national self-interest, he supported the
rule oflaw, a free and active press, a political balance of powers, and the rights of the
citizens to demand a just social contract. In Texas, this republican standard became the
justification for many Texans to demand separation from Mexico and annexation to the
United States. Although Texas would not be formally attached to the United States until
1845, the yeoman republic's access to land was assured by Texas' secession and affinity
to the United States. However, by the same logic that the settlements of Anglo Americans
created the conditions for the extension of the American republic into Mexican territory,
the existence of Native American tribes in the Southeastern United States threatened the
expansion of the U.S. into land needed to support the yeoman farmer. Assertions of
landownership meant little if the land was actually inhabited by others. While in Texas
the very presence of Anglo-Americans eventually made the land American, in the
Southeastern U.S., the continued existence ofNative communities separatedthe republic
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from land. The necessary supply of land could not be assured unless it was first emptied
of indigenous claimants. Furthermore, the need for farmland was not limited to the
yeomen, as wealthy, slave-owning plantation farmers also sought to extend their acreage.
Native American tribes occupied land coveted by white Americans, who were moving
into the state of Georgia and the surrounding areas. The Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek
tribes relocated west ofthe Mississippi over the course of the 1830s, but significant
portions of the Seminole and Cherokee continued to resist removal. Groups of Seminole
Indians, and the escaped slaves that lived among them, hid in the swamps ofFlorida
during a long military effort to hunt them down, and violently defied federal orders to
surrender and relocate. Leaders of the Cherokee resisted removal by creating a
government founded on republican principles and adopting cultural practices considered
by many Anglo-Americans and Cherokee alike as evidence of civilization. Cherokee
claims to sovereignty and republicanism necessitated a shift in emphasis in Poinsett's
republican rhetoric and ideology, from inclusion to exclusion.
In response to Cherokees' aspirations to republicanism, Poinsett adopted different
tactics than those he had used in the emerging nations of Spanish America. As a
diplomat, he had fostered republican pretensions, as an Indian remover, he denied
republican projects. Poinsett helped narrow the definition of republicanism according to
race, and reject the belief that Indians had the ability to obtain liberty, virtue, and
internationally respected claims to sovereignty. First he used his position as a respected
patron of science to articulate a defense of a relocation policy towards Native Americans
based on immutable racial limitation. Poinsett's stance on U.S.-Native American
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relations signified a dramatic departure from the Jeffersonian model that had been guided
by the belief that Native Americans could be eventually assimilated into Anglo-American
culture. Poinsett entered into a new public debate that began to emerge in the 1830s, on
perceived racial differences between whites, blacks, Native Americans, and Mexicans, as
well as newly "discovered" people in Africa and the south Pacific.235 Poinsett needed an
elaborate anthropological and philosophical justification, and his ideological rationale
will be examined in-depth below. Later, as Secretary of War, he applied his military and
political power to affect the forcible removal of the Cherokee Nation. In spite of
previous, legally binding treaties and Cherokee advances toward integrating basic
republican values into their culture and politics, Poinsett denied their sovereignty and
attempted to discredit and depose their elected leader.
During the 1830s, Poinsett was a vocal advocate for Andrew Jackson's Indian
Removal Act of 1830. The law gave Jackson's administration power to negotiate removal
treaties that would reimburse the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, Cherokee and Seminole
tribes for surrendering their land and moving to Indian Country. The absence of Indian
settlements would guarantee sufficient land for a government founded onagrarian
principles, and the new treaties would imbue the seizure of Indian lands with legal
integrity. Yet, tribal leaders of the Seminole and Cherokee Indians refused to voluntarily
cede their lands, negate their previous treaties that guaranteed them the rights to their
land, and lead their people peacefully westward. Controversy over the Indian Removal
Act, already a source of political friction, increased when removal was resisted and
235 Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny, 116-119.
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became compulsory?36 Some adherents to the divisive policy defended the nullification
of legally binding treaties and the removal of original inhabitants of the land by claiming
that removal was the only way to protect Native Americans from the ultimate degradation
and extinction that would result from their interaction with Anglo-Americans?37 Poinsett
expanded this argument with an effort to explain cultural, and seemingly biological,
variation among the descendents ofEuropeans and indigenous people of North
America.238 In particular Poinsett, and other proponents of the 1830 Indian Removal Act,
advocated an understanding of the immutable nature ofNative American populations,
and their fundamental inability to assimilate to Anglo-Saxon civilization. Poinsett built
on polygenetic arguments that contended human variation could only be explained ifthe
earth supported several species of humans, each with their own separate origin, and
developed his own understanding of anthropology and republicanism that rationalized
and justified Indian Removal.
On May 14, 1834, Poinsett, as President of the Literary and Philosophical Society
of Charleston, delivered an essay entitled, An Inquiry into the Received Opinions of
236 Alfred A. Cave, "Abuse of Power: Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act of 1830," The
Historian 65, no. 6 (2003): 1332-1336; Lathel F. Duffield, "Cherokee Emigration: Reconstructing Reality,"
Chronicles ofOklahoma 80, no. 3 (2002): 316.
237 Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Long Bitter Trail (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993),48.
238 Polygenists, like Benjamin Rush and James Madison believed that humans did not share the same
origin. Polygenism provided ajustification of slavery and Indian removal on racial differences, arguing that
Blacks and Native Americans were fixed at lower stages of development. Patterson argues the debate
between monogencists - those who believed humans were all of the same species, and polygenecists who
believed there were races of people who represented separate species, become an "increasingly prominent
feature of everyday discourse during the 183Os and 1840s." See Thomas C. Patterson, A Social History of
Anthropology in the United States (New York: Berg, 2001); Robert F. Berkhofer, White Man's Indian:
Images ofthe American Indian, from Columbus to the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 1978);
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia.
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Philosophers and Historians, on the Natural Progress ofthe Human Racefrom
Barbarism to Civilization. 239 In this address, he opposed theories that humankind
advanced through stages of civilization. He did not believe, he explained, that all human
societies ultimately progress through three distinct, consecutive phases that culminate in
an enlightened citizenry capable of advanced agrarian practices and principled social
contracts. Poinsett set out to correct the misconception that humans began everywhere as
barbarians achieving sustenance through hunting and gathering, who would ultimately
progress to a pastoral stage when scarcity finally required them to domesticate the
animals they once hunted. Or that this, in turn, would advance to the agricultural stage
and true civilization, once growing population and dwindling resources made the
shepherd's life untenable. He argued that what others perceived as stages within the
progression toward civilization were actually fixed and immutable categories: hunters
and gatherers would remain savages and barbarians; shepherds always were and always
would be tribal nomads with no need for agriculture or the comforts and beauty of
civilization; and farmers had always existed as such, the only people since time
immemorial capable of such advanced pursuits. In his own words:
There is no record of the Caucasian race having risen by
degrees from fishers and hunters to the pastoral state; nor is
there any example of the Shepherd Tribes becoming
civilized agriculturalists. Both races appear unchanged by
climate or situation, and unaffected by any other
circumstances than intermixture with each other. The same
may be said of the hunting and fishing Tribes, which are
constant in their habits and as irreclaimable as the Shepherd
239 Joel Poinsett, An Inquiry into the Received Opinions ofPhilosophers and Historians: On the Natural
Progress ofthe Human Racefrom Barbarism to Civilization (Charleston: lS. Burges, 1834).
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race. In this instance, man resembles some other species of
animals.24o
On that evening in May, Poinsett stood before his audience in Charleston, savvy
and well-traveled. His speech blended exotic eye-witness accounts and ethnographic
analyses into a cosmopolitan celebration of the superior and exclusive nature of white
civilization. He first demonstrated the fundamental importance of the types of
ethnographic and philosophical inquiries he and his organization addressed. "Where
science and literature are cherished, despotism cannot long maintain its domain," he
proclaimed. "Riches and plenty are the natural effects of liberty," while learning fosters
equality, and this virtuous combination, pursued by the Literary and Philosophical
Society, "deserves therefore the patronage of the enlightened citizens of the republic."Z41
Quite unselfconsciously, he transitioned from a congratulatory inventory of the higher
forms of learning made possible within a civilized and virtuous republic, to the subject of
his essay, the immutable condition of members of indigenous hunting tribes. They, of
course, were not poised on the cusp of exciting new scientific and philosophical
understanding, but instead on the brink of extinction. Poinsett justified Indian Removal
by asserting that Indians were not capable of becoming civilized, but were in danger of
becoming fatally corrupted if they continued to live among civilized people.
240 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 34-35.
241 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 7-8.
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The ongoing debate over whether Indians and other' savages and barbarians' had
the potential capacity to become civilized was certainly not new?42 Jefferson theorized
that Native North Americans were capable of advancement toward civilization as
individuals, but that tribes were not the type of social organizations that could adopt
republican institutions?43 He recognized that Indians had art, reason, sentiment, oratory,
and although Jefferson noted that they may be vulnerable to extinction, he considered
them potential civilized citizens?44 Jefferson assumed Indians owned their land,
although he considered future Indian migration westward as a way to facilitate the
expansion of the yeomanry. Under Jefferson's model, any land cessation from Indians
had to occur through legitimate and binding treaties. The North West Ordinance of 1787
and the Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790 were written from the position that the United
States must expand honorably, through agreements achieved with Indian tribes, and not
through coercive removal and land seizure.
Jefferson's policy toward Indian tribes continued under subsequent
administrations. In 1816, Secretary of War, William H. Crawford generated a series of
recommendations to regulate the commercial interactions ofAnglo and Native
Americans. He advocated the implementation of protective measures that would create a
government depot at the mouth of the Missouri that would support the economic viability
of Indian traders. The depot would protect the interests of the Indians and serve as a
242 For an in-depth analysis of the development of the debate see Wallace, White Man's Indian and
Horsman, Race and manifest Destiny.
243 Jefferson, Nates a/the State a/Virginia, 67-68 & 104.
244 Jefferson, Nates a/the State a/Virginia, 141-144.
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buffer between them and corrupt whites, in order to "create capital in their hands. ,,245 He
went on to say, however, that this advice was "substantially founded upon the conviction
that it is the true policy and earnest desire of the government to draw its savage neighbors
within the pale of civilization." Crawford added, "If I am mistaken in this point - if the
primary object of the government is to extinguish the Indian title, and settle their lands as
rapidly as possible, then commerce with them ought to be entirely abandoned to
individual enterprise, and without regulation." 246
In 1829, Lewis Cass, the governor of Michigan territory who later became
Jackson's Secretary of War, wrote an essay opposing policies of assimilation. Cass laid
the foundation for Poinsett's later address in Charleston, providing convincing
ethnographic descriptions to bolster his claims. Cass had had observed the culture of
Indians of the Northeastern United states, and argued that the tribes continued to decline,
not improve,z47 He saw no hope for the civilization ofIndians, citing the dramatic
population decline he attributed to their inability to assimilate,z48 He believed that all
Native Americans were precluded from civilization due to their fundamentally savage
nature, recounting their hunting practices, and their resistance to the opportunities
available to improve themselves. Although less familiar with the natives of the
245 Crawford to Gaillard, February 24, 1816, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 14th Congress 142nd
Session.
246 Crawford to Gaillard, February 24, 1816, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 14th Congress 142nd
Session.
247 Wallace, The Long Bitter Trail, 41.
248 Lewis Cass, "Documents and Proceedings Relating to the Formation and Progress of the Board in the
City of New York, for the Emigration, Reservation, and Improvement of the Aborigines of America," The
North American Historical Review 30, no. 66 (1830): 69-70.
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southeastern United States, he believed that 'civilized' tribes, like the Cherokee, were
bound by the same limitations and incapable of civilization. He wrote that while
"individuals among the Cherokee have acquired property, and with it more enlarged
views and juster notions of the value ofour institutions, and the unprofitableness of their
own," the majority of the tribe was "in a state of helplessness and hopeless poverty.,,249
Cass went on to denigrate the accomplishments made by the Cherokee, doubting the
existence of "a more wretched race than the Cherokee," who "exhibit spectacles as
disgusting as they are degrading. ,,250 Cass contested the idea that Indians had sovereignty
over their lands, as they were in his opinion, only hunting grounds, writing: "it is not like
our tenure; they have no idea of a title to the land itself. It is overrun by them rather than
inhabited.,,251 Cass also argued that previous treaties made with tribes did not establish
their sovereignty or land ownership, saying "No terms in these compacts could have been
intended to convey the sovereignty of the territory, or the absolute dominion over the
soil.,,252
Poinsett's treatment of the subject had neither the ambiguity of Crawford's
position, nor the pragmatic details ofCass's report. Instead he approached the matter
philosophically and anthropologically; he presented his own positions in opposition to
well-known European scholars, and supported them with the evidence of his own travels
249 Cass, "Documents and Proceedings," 71
250 Cass, "Documents and Proceedings," 71.
251 Cass, "Documents and Proceedings," 80.
252 Cass, "Documents and Proceedings," 83.
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and international awareness. Poinsett was on the cusp of an increasingly racialized
understanding of human differences. This debate reflected a transition from the late
eighteenth-century bias against non-white people, a combination of Enlightenment
optimism and a "visceral distrust of physical difference," to an "objective" and "self-
conscious" belief in the "radical inferiority of certain viably different groups" that was
articulated by the 1830s and 1840s.253 That evening in Charleston, Poinsett asserted
evidence that nomadic and hunting people either lived separately from civilized people or
became extinct, but did not progress toward civilization. He used his interaction with a
nomadic chieftain in the steppes of Central Asia over a shared dish of singed sheep-head
to exemplify "the chief reason of the immutable condition of these people," which
stemmed from "the invincible repugnance of mankind to submit to the restraints imposed
by the labor of the agricultural pursuits, a repugnance to be overcome by absolute
want.,,254 The 'absolute want' necessary for advancing out of a nomadic, herd-based
society could not materialize, however, because food and shelter were provided by the
milk, meat and hide of the animals they lived among. The nomads, said Poinsett, "love
their free and wandering life, and live surrounded by a superior race ...without envying
their condition, but actually commiserating them for the restraint under which they
253 Poinsett used the theories of historians Comte. De Buffon, Edward Gibbons, and William Robertson as
foils, explicitly rejecting their shared belief that human societies originate from the same act of creation,
progress toward enlightenment, and also Buffon's pejorative assertion that New World climate produces
weak and deficient inhabitants .. See Nicholas Hudson, "From "Nation" to "Race": The Origins of Racial
Classification in Eighteenth-Century Thought," Eighteenth-Century Studies 29 no. 3 (1996), 251.
254 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 13.
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live.,,255 After Poinsett described to the nomadic leader the comforts afforded by
civilization, the chief "pitied the luxurious Frenchman who eats the most delicate foods,
and drinks the choicest wines and lives in a palace, because he has no steppes, and is
compelled to pasture his cattle within enclosed fields!,,256
Also precluded from civilization, in Poinsett's opinion, were people who achieved
sustenance through hunting. Poinsett completely rejected the notion that the native
inhabitants of the regions extending from the Hudson's Bay to the Gulf of Mexico could
be drawn 'into the pale of civilization,' as Crawford had endeavored to do. Indians were
"found in the hunter state," and the condition was immutable.257 One of his most colorful
pieces of evidence showing the irredeemable nature of the savage man came not from his
direct experience, but from a Jesuit priest who worked to convert and civilize Tupis,
Tupayas, and Boticudos tribes people in Brazil. Poinsett told his audience that the Jesuit:
Having taught and catechized and instructed an old Brazilian
woman in the nature of Christianity; and he had supposed fully
converted her and completely taken care of her soul; finding her
one day sick, he asked her if she could eat anything. "Grandam",
said he (that being the word of courtesy by which it is usual to
address old women in Brazilian society) "if I were to get you a
little sugar now, or a mouthful of some of our nice things ...do you
think you could eat it?"
"Ah! My grandson!" Said the old convert, "My stomach goes
against everything - there is but one thing which I think I could
touch. If I had the hand of a little tender Tapuya boy, I think I
could pick the little bones - but woe is me , there is nobody to go
out and shoot one for me!258
255 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 14.
256 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 14.
257 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 34-35.
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In Poinsett's view, the woman in Brazil and the Indians in North and South
America societies resembled "some other species of animal. ,,259 The divide between the
hunter and the agriculturalist was "as great a difference between the two races as between
the untamed wolf and the domestic house dog.,,26o He emphasized the hopelessness of
attempts at cultural amelioration, stating, "It is to be feared that not even the most urgent
of necessity can ever drive the free hunter of our forests from his indolent habits. They
have proven untamable, and have either retired before the improvements of whites of
have perished near them.,,261 As fixed in their barbarity as the Brazilian grandmother,
they had not, stated Poinsett, "made any progress in their social condition.,,262
Civilized agriculturalists were born, not made. Poinsett's travels again informed
his definition of civilization as he identified examples of communities engaged in the
activities so fundamental to the agrarian yeoman republic: "In the mountains of the
Daguenstan, which skirt the Caspian Sea, the inhabitants are agriculturalists, descendants
of the Caucasian race. They descend into the plains in the spring of the year, and till and
sow the land... these tribes had, from time immemorial, preserved their distinctive
character and pursuits .. .it is impossible to imagine a nobler model of mankind than is
presented by the civilized agriculturalist of the Caucus... ,,263 According to Poinsett,
259 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 37.
260 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 35.
261 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 20.
262 Poinsett, An Inquiry, 43.
263 poinsett, An Inquiry, 35-36.
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societies, or 'races' were fixed at their stage of development. Hunters could not aspire to
agriculturalism; therefore, barbarians could not become civilized. Agriculture was the
basis of a successful republic, and if hunters, or Native Americans, could not become
civilized agriculturalists, then they could not become republicans. Poinsett racialized the
definition of republicanism in order to exclude claims to sovereignty and land raised by
Indian tribes that resisted removal. He constructed a rationale that neutralized Native
American aspirations to self-government by asserting that it was unobtainable. In
Poinsett's view, the immutability of the 'savage' condition of all Indian tribes required
removal. Poinsett did not directly address the Cherokee, and the case made against his
position through their resolve to adopt Anglo-American civilization.
Members of the Cherokee Nation opposed removal on the very grounds that
Poinsett dismissed. They had, claimed prominent Cherokee leaders, become civilized
agrarian republicans. In April of 1834, a month before Poinsett delivered his address in
Charleston, John Ross, the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation delivered an address
to the Seneca Indians. The Seneca tribe was part of the federation of Northeastem Indians
called the Iroquois League. The Seneca Indians were facing pressure from corrupt land
speculators who were emboldened by Jackson's removal policy to fraudulently acquire
Seneca land.264 He encouraged his audience to resist removal by endeavoring to
incorporate tenets of republicanism into their culture and government. First, he
introduced their present situation under Jackson's Indian Removal policy and the
264 Arthur C. Parker, The History ofthe Seneca Indians (port Washington, Long island: Ira 1. Friedman,
Inc., 1926), 142-143.
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historical claims Native Americans had to the land they were supposed to cede. "The
tradition of our Fathers and the written history of the white man tells us that this great and
extensive continent was once the sole and exclusive abode of our race," Ross announced,
"Yes this charming country was once ours; and over these fields and through these forests
our Fathers once, in careless gaiety, pursued their sports and hunted their game.,,265 Ross
supplemented this recognition of historical Native American claims to the land ofNorth
America with a description of the arrival that irrevocably changed the fate of Cherokee
and Seneca alike. "Amidst all of this innocence, simplicity, and bliss-the white man
came; and lo! the animated chase, the feast, the dance, the songs of fearless, thoughtless
joy were over," stated Ross, " And ever since we have been made to drink the bitter cup
of humiliation; treated like dogs; our lives, our liberties, the sport of the white man. ,,266
Ross then described how Indian tribes attempted to adapt to the advances of Anglo-
Americans, until "driven from river to river, from forest to forest ...we find ourselves
fugitives, vagrants and strangers in our own country and look forward to a period oftime
when our descendents will perhaps be totally extinguished." 267
Ross, himself a well-educated plantation owner, then spoke of a solution to the
untenable position that the Cherokee shared with the Seneca. "It is by education [that] the
mind is cultivated and enlightened," explained Ross, "whereby the intelligence of man
265 John Ross to the Seneca Delegation, Washington City, April 14, 1834, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross
Vol. I, ed. Gary E. Moulton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985),285-286.
266 John Ross to the Seneca Delegation, Washington City, April 14, 1834, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross,
285-286.
267John Ross to the Seneca Delegation, Washington City, April 14, 1834, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross,
285-286.
89
becomes expanded and is elevated, to the highest degree possible for human intelligence
to attain.,,268 Ross recognized that "in wisdom and superior knowledge, the force of
power exists," and encouraged his audience of Seneca Indians to join the Cherokee in
seizing the power of knowledge and "encourage schools and the education of our
children and the adoption of the habits of civilized life.,,269 Progression towards
civilization was a worthy goal for the tribes to share, especially as "the superiority of the
white people over the Indian mainly consists only in their cultivation and acquirements of
the arts and sciences. ,,270
Acknowledging the constraints on these proposals, Ross addressed the pressing
issue of Jackson's removal policy. First, Ross described the decision by the Choctaws,
Chickasaws and Creeks to leave their lands and settle in Indian Country, and then turned
to the different course of action the Cherokee, empowered by the knowledge of both
history and law, had chosen. Although, "the existence of the Indian Nations as distinct
independent communities within the limits of the United States seems to be drawing to a
close," said Ross, "we have determined to cling to our original rights in the country
where we first drew the breath of life-for these rights have been recognized and secured
by treaties under the solemn pledge of the United States to protect them unto US.,,271 Ross
268 John Ross to the Seneca Delegation, Washington City, April 14, 1834, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross,
285.
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believed he could pursue a legal course of action that would forestall the removal of the
Cherokee. He laid claim to the promise of civilization, the authority of Jeffersonian-era
treaties, and the Cherokee Nation's rights to its land, while attempting to inspire the
Seneca to likewise resist removal.
John Ross and other members of the Cherokee Nation had long realized that their
best claim to their sovereignty and the land they occupied lay in changing their culture,
political organization, and farming patterns to resemble those of Anglo-Americans.
Reaching back to the Jeffersonian era, 1791, the Treaty of Holston demanded that the
Cherokee advance to a higher degree of civilization, and become herdsmen and
agriculturalists in order to keep their land.272 The Cherokee worked to assimilate, and
with the influence of Moravian missionaries, intermarriage with whites, and tribal strong
leadership, built schools and developed a sophisticated, bicultural society. In 1810, the
Cherokee organized a National government that reorganized their political system,
creating a system of national courts and a police force?73 On July 4, 1827, Ross and other
leaders reported the Cherokee Nation's constitution to the federal government, gesturing
to the date made famous by American revolutionaries, as had the Chileans the previous
decade.274 The document closely resembled the constitution of the United States, and
explicitly extended the Cherokee Nation's legal jurisdiction throughout their territory. In
272 Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, The Cherokee Removal: A BriefHistory with Documents (Boston:
St. Martin's Press, 2004), 11.
273 Walter H. Cosner, Jr., "John Ross and the Cherokee Resistance Campaign, 1833-1838," The Journal of
Southern History 44, no. 2 (1978): 192.
274 Mary Young, "The Cherokee Nation: A Mirror of the Republic," American Quarterly 33, no. 5 (1981):
507.
91
a further attempt to encourage literacy and national pride, Sequoyah, another prominent
Cherokee, developed the Cherokee syllabary, putting the Cherokee language into written
form. Ross purchased a printing press for the nation, and Cherokee leader Elias Boudinot
edited the Cherokee Phoenix, the Cherokee Nation's newspaper. 275 The Cherokee
Phoenix had articles in both English and Sequoyah's syllabary, providing Cherokee
people an opportunity to participate in public discourse, while bolstering their national
identity. During this time, the Cherokee also altered their farming practices, often
replacing subsistence-oriented agriculture performed by women with plantation
agriculture done by men, and even slave labor. The Cherokee constructed a model
republic, founded in the ideals of liberty, in the form ofjurisdiction over their land, and
dedicated to encouraging the virtue of the citizemy, by encouraging education,
agriculture, and a participatory public.276
However, by working to achieve 'civilization,' the Cherokee aroused the ire of
the state of Georgia. The political leaders in Georgia and the Anglo-American settlers
that demanded land on Cherokee territory, refused to accept Cherokee jurisdiction over
Cherokee land, the jurisdiction that the Cherokee constitution had codified. Georgia
rejected Cherokee sovereignty and their constitution, declaring that Cherokee laws were
invalid and superseded by the authority of the state government.277 Ross and his
supporters fought Georgian political and territorial encroachment in two court cases,
275 Ross, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 5.
276 Young, "The Cherokee Nation," 503-504.
277 Duffield, "Cherokee Emigration," 323.
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831 and Worcester v. Georgia in 1832. First identified as
a "dependent domestic nation by" the Supreme Court in 1831, the following year the
highest court in the United States ruled that treaties made between the United States and
the Cherokee represented a higher authority than that of the state government of Georgia
and that therefore Georgia could not force the Cherokee Nation off of their land. Jackson
did not enforce the court's decision however, and Anglo-American conflict between the
state of Georgia and the Cherokee Nation continued unabated. Gold was discovered in
the Cherokee Nation, further encouraging Anglo-American migration to the region. The
Georgian government began evicting Cherokee families from their homes and awarding
their land to land-hungry Georgian farmers, plantation owners, and miners through a
lottery system.278
In 1835, the Cherokee Nation's claims to its land in Georgia were fatally
comprised when a small, non-representative group of Cherokee signed the Treaty of New
Echota. A faction of Cherokee, led by Elias Boudinot, Major Pathkiller Ridge, and his
son John, agreed to cede all Cherokee land in the Georgia and surrounding states in
exchange for 5 million dollars and relocation assistance for the Cherokee people.279 Ross
had traveled to attend the meeting at New Echota, but his rejection of the treaty was
deferred because he was arrested and held until after the treaty was signed.28o In 1836,
Ross addressed the House of Representatives with his complaints, calling the group of
278 Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration ofthe Five Civilized Tribes ofIndians (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1932),238.
279 Ross, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 7.
280 Foreman, Indian Removal, 268.
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Cherokee that signed the treaty "a spurious delegation," who "in violation of a special
injunction of the general council of the nation, proceeded to Washington city with this
pretended treaty, and by false and fraudulent representations" agreed to a program of land
cessation that "despoiled us of our private possessions.,,281
The members of the Treaty Party, as they came to be known, moved west of the
Mississippi River. The majority of the Cherokee Nation did not support the treaty,
considered it illegal, and resisted removal. The removal deadline specified in the treaty
was May 23, 1838, and Ross dedicated the next two and a half years to exposing the
illegitimacy of the treaty, traveling yearly to Washington with his delegation to deliver
legal challenges to the government.282 He protested the Treaty of New Echota on both
legal and ethical grounds. In 1836, he gave an address to the House of Representatives,
stating: "Our property may be plundered before our very eyes; violence may be
committed on our persons; even our lives may be taken away, and there is none to regard
our complaints. We are denationalized; we are disenfranchised; we are deprived of
membership in the human family ... ,,283 He then appealed the common heritage of
republican independence of the Cherokee Nation and the United States. "It is true, our
cause is your own," asserted Ross, "It is the cause of liberty and justice...based on your
own principles ... for we have gloried to count your Jefferson and your Washington our
281 Ross to the Senate and House Representatives of the United States of America, September 28, 1836,
Serial Set 99, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, 12.
282 Ross to the Senate and House Representatives of the United States of America, September 28,1836,
Serial Set 99, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, 12.
283 Ross to the Senate and House Representatives of the United States of America, September 28, 1836,
Serial Set 99, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, 12-13.
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great teachers.,,284 The Cherokee leaders had adhered to the recommendations of these
iconic men, "read their communications ... with veneration," and "practiced their precepts
with success.,,285 The resulting advancement of the Cherokee, said Ross, was manifest:
"the wildness of the forest has given way to comfortable dwellings and cultivated fields,
stocked with the various domestic enjoyments, have succeeded to the rudeness of the
savage state.286
Ross made his case that not only was the treaty illegal, but that the philosophical
justification for Indian Removal was flawed. The Cherokee had demonstrated their
civilization, which was the original requirement for the recognition of their sovereignty
over their lands under the binding treaties of the Jeffersonian era. In August, 1837, Ross
reminded Colonel John Mason Jr., Poinsett's Removal Agent (who had previously served
as his Secretary Legate in Mexico), that while it was "encouraging to [the Cherokee
people] to be assured that their efforts to escape from ignorance and barbarism, their
improvements in the arts and comforts of life, and the diffusion among them of the
inestimable blessings of Christianity meet the cordial approbation of the President," they
were reluctant to alter "the course which in compliance with former presidents, they had
284 Ross to the Senate and House Representatives of the United States of America, September 28, 1836,
Serial Set 99, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, 12-13.
285 Ross to the Senate and House Representatives of the United States of America, September 28, 1836,
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pursued and found to be eminently successful in the advancement of their welfare as a
people.,,287
Poinsett and Ross, having given opposite opinions on the fate of Native
Americans and their ability to advance toward civilization within a month of each other
in 1834, crossed paths for the first time when Poinsett was appointed Secretary of War by
President Martin Van Buren in 1837. Poinsett was authorized to carry out the policy he
had advocated for President Jackson, and now he had the power of the United States
military and the authority of the War department at his disposal. Unlike in Chile and
Mexico, Poinsett would not have to rely on social networks and personal alliances to
carry out his aim. Instead of cultivating a relationship with the Principal Chief of the
Cherokee, Poinsett worked to depose Ross. Poinsett recognized the threat that Ross posed
to the policy of Indian Removal through his legal and philosophical challenges of the
policy, and his tendency to encourage other tribes to join him in his resistance. By
attacking the ideological justification behind the seizure of Indian lands, Ross questioned
the very basis of the American republic's right to expand. Ross claimed that Cherokee
Removal would not protect the tribe's viability, as some claimed, but would instead
interrupt their republic's progress and violate their sovereignty over their territory. This
sovereignty had been supported by the policies of former presidents and manifested by
the development of the Cherokee culture. Ross did not confine his opposition to removal
policies to his own followers, but reached out to the leaders of other tribes, like the
287 Ross to Colonel Mason, Red Clay, Cherokee Nation, August 11, 1837, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross,
514-515.
96
Seneca and in 1837, the Seminole, establishing himself as a leader with the dangerous
potential to spark a pan-Indian resistance movement.
Poinsett's first opportunity to damage Ross' credibility as a leader of a broader
resistance to Indian Removal came in the winter of 1837. Ross offered to act as an
intermediary between Poinsett's military and the Seminole chiefs, who led a bloody
insurgency against the United States government in the wilds of Florida. Although both
the Seminole and the Cherokee faced removal, the two tribes shared few other
similarities. While Cherokee lands were valuable to the expanding agrarian republic, the
land that the Seminole occupied in Florida was unfit for farming. Poinsett's military
leader in Florida, Major General Jesup questioned the wisdom and the cost ofthe
Seminole Wars, as their lands were not necessary for farmland, but Poinsett insisted the
army continue the bloody guerilla war.288 The impracticality of the Seminole Wars
reveals the fundamental intolerance of Indian presence in the yeoman republic, and the
vulnerability ofthe Indian Removal policy. If any significant number ofNative people
remained east of the Mississippi River, they might threaten the rationale behind the
appropriation ofIndian land through their ability to survive and thrive, and could possibly
inspire increased resistance to the policy.289 However, Ross' offer to mediate between the
Seminole Chiefs and the U.S. military was also problematic, as an alliance between the
tribes was an unattractive possibility to removal proponents.
288 The decision to continue the Seminole Wars "rested solely with Poinsett," and in a "war full of bad
decisions, Poinsett's rejection of Jesup's proposal stands out as one of the worst." See John Missall and
Mary Lou Missall, The Seminole Wars: America's Longest Indian Conflict (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 2004), 146.
289 Missall and Missall, The Seminole Wars, 150-152.
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Ross sent a letter to the leaders of the Seminole, first establishing the similarities
in the experiences of the two tribes. "I am of the aboriginal race of this great Island-and
so are you. The path which leads from my Council fire to that of yours of a long one, and
there has been no intercourse between us---our native language is different from that of
yours, and we are strangers to one another.,,290 Ross went on to commiserate with the
"the gloom which overspreads your land, of the loud mutterings of the big gun and the
shrill echo of the war-hoop," and the "hostile blow which has been struck between you
and our white brethren.,,291 Ross sought to encourage the Seminole by sharing his own
resistance strategy: "Perchance you may have heard that the Cherokee are also in
troubled about their own lands-this is true-but I have spoken to my people, and they
have listened. I told them to remember the language of the President Washington and that
of his illustrious successors, and to hold fast to the faith of treaties which by our mutual
consent has been solemnly pledged between our nation and the United States.,,292 Ross
and his delegation, having recently met with Poinsett, informed the Seminoles that "I told
our older brother [Poinsett], that it grieved my heart to hear of the shedding of blood
between our white and red brethren and the Seminoles-and asked if it could not be
290 Ross to the Chiefs, Headmen and Warriors of the Seminoles, Washington, October 18, 1837, The
Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 523-524.
291 Ross to the Chiefs, Headmen and Warriors of the Seminoles, Washington, October 18,1837, The
Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 523-524.
291 Ross to the Chiefs, Headmen and Warriors of the Seminoles, Washington, October 18, 1837, The
Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 523-524.
292 Ross to the Chiefs, Headmen and Warriors of the Seminoles, Washington, October 18, 1837, The
Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 523-524.
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stopped, and healed by the balm ofpeace.,,293 Poinsett agreed to let the Cherokee help
negotiate a treaty and facilitate a meeting between Poinsett's generals and the Seminole
chiefs. "You, Osceola and Powel, and all others who may have been considered as
principle actors in the conflict, shall be received into the equal favor and protection with
all the Seminoles in the treaty of peace," Ross assured the Seminole leaders, "I have
therefore proffered to become mediator for the restoration of peace and friendship
between you and our white brethren.,,294
The Seminole Chiefs Osceola, Powel, and Micanopy had been elusive and
dangerous, engaging in guerilla warfare against the U.S. military.295 Jesup worked to
overcome their resistance, and had met with principal Seminole chiefs six months before,
in June 1837. Jesup described the meeting to Poinsett, defending himself against
anticipated accusations of leniency. "I might have seized them and captured their camp,
but such an act would have been an infraction of the treaty," he explained to Poinsett, but
was, he continued, "unwilling to teach a lesson of barbarism to a band of savages.,,296
These inhibitions to violating treaties ensuring peaceful meetings between the leaders of
Indian chiefs and the U.S. military did not last, nor did they extend to the meeting
mediated by the Cherokee that winter. Instead, Jesup's troops abruptly seized Micanopy
293 Ross to the Chiefs, Headmen and Warriors ofthe Seminoles, Washington, October 18, 1837, The
Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 523-524.
294 Ross to the Chiefs, Headmen and Warriors of the Seminoles, Washington, October 18, 1837, The
Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 523-524.
295 Missall and Missall, The Seminole Wars, 146-149.
296 Jesup to Poinsett, Tampa Bay, June 7, 1837, American State Papers, House of Representatives, Military
Affairs, Vol. 6, no. 760, 872. Jesup captured Osceola under a flag of truce before the meeting that was
mediated by the Cherokee delegation.
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and the other Seminole chiefs who had accompanied him, although their liberty had been
assured.
Ross protested this violation to Poinsett, noting the damage it had done to the trust
Ross had attempted to cultivate between the tribes. He wrote to him in January 1838,
protesting "against this unprecedented violation of that sacred rule which has ever been
recognized by every nation, civilized and uncivilized, of treating with all due respect
those who have ever presented themselves under a flag of truce before their enemy, for
the purposes of terminating warfare.,,297 Ross pursued the subject in March, 1838,
reminding Poinsett that:
The Cherokee mediators ... no sooner recovered from their
astonishment, than they asked to clear themselves from the
appearance of treachery, in the mind of the Seminoleans,
who had unhesitatingly come through their means, into the
lines of the army, for negotiation, and there lost their
liberty...The reasons for anxiety among the Cherokee
mediators on this subject were particularly cogent. Unless
fully cleared from suspicion, what might be the
consequence, should any of the Cherokee and Seminoleans
at some future time be neighbors? Merited distrust and
scorn! Permanent and deadly rancor!298
The capture of the Seminole chiefs in the presence of the Cherokee mediators did not
further a pan-Indian alliance, but instead threatened to poison the relationship between
the two tribes and Ross' relationship with Poinsett. Ross' delegation later visited the
captured Seminole chiefs, in an attempt to repair the damage caused by Cherokee
involvement in their seizure, and previous disagreements that had erupted during their
297 Ross to Poinsett, Washington, March 8, 1828, Serial Set 285, 25th Congress, 2nd session, 11.
298 Ross to Poinsett, Washington, March 8, 1828, Serial Set 330, 25th Congress, 2nd session, 16.
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journey to meet Jesup. Although the captive chiefs "at length acknowledged that they
dismissed from their mind all suspicion of treachery, on the part of their Cherokee
brethren," Ross was unable to secure their release and heard rumors that members of the
tribe continued to blame the Cherokees for their capture. 299 Ross may have lost his
credibility with the remnants of the Seminole leadership, but he had learned to be
skeptical of the integrity of the Secretary of War.
As these events unfolded, the deadline for removal was fast approaching. Many
Cherokees believed that Ross and his delegation would renegotiate an agreement with the
federal government that would allow them to stay on their land. Ross was not without
support in the Anglo-American community. Many members of Jackson and Van Buren's
rival political party, the Whigs, opposed the Democrat's reinterpretation of U.S. policy
toward Indians. Several churches and associations sent petitions to Washington in protest.
For example, a memorial presented by Pennsylvanians asserted the Cherokee's "ancient
and indisputable title [to] the land on which they reside," and the illegitimacy of a treaty
signed by "less than a hundred obscure and unauthorized individuals.,,30o This suggests,
not only that the naked aggression of removal policy was morally repugnant to some
Anglo-Americans, but also that the illegality of removal disturbed notions ofjustice and
the rule of law. Treaties and laws were sacrosanct, the basis for a nation true to
republicanism. Yet, to the dismay of many the legal integrity of the United States was
299 Ross to Poinsett, Washington, March 8, 1828, Serial Set 330, 25th Congress, 2nd session, 17.
300 Memorial of a Number of Citizens of Pennsylvania to the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States, Washington City, April 19, 1838, House Serial Set 330, no. 390, 1-2. This is but one
example of several such documents.
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blatantly sacrificed to expansion. The debate continued to rage as the Senate considered
ratifying the treaty despite its blatant illegitimacy, ultimately deciding to do so. To ensure
sufficient land for the yeoman republic, republicanism had to be blunted, and domestic
imperialism pursued. Poinsett may have denied the Cherokee capacity for virtue and
liberty, but the actions he took to remove them from Georgia revealed the emptiness of
his rhetoric and ideology. If American republicanism was no longer substantially
different from European colonialism, than what exactly defined it?
While Ross protested the Treaty ofNew Echota in Washington, the United States
military began trying to capture Cherokee resistors and confine them to military
encampments to await transport. This was a difficult task, and strategies employed in
previous removal efforts reappeared in the effort to remove the Cherokees. In October
1837, Jackson had suggested to Poinsett that in order to flush out the Seminole resisters,
he should find and capture the Seminole women and children in order to encourage the
men to voluntarily assemble for removal.301 April of 1838, Governor Lumpkin of Georgia
echoed Jackson's strategy to the Georgia Senate, saying "I would suggest the propriety of
collecting Indian women and children, and treating them with special care and kindness,
where the men may happen to be out of place, either by design or accident-and a doubt
can scarcely be entertained that the absent men will soon follow their women and
children.,,302 Through coercion and capture, the Cherokee were rounded up.
301 Missall and Missall, The Seminole Wars, 149.
302 Wilson Lumpkin, The Removal ofthe Cherokee Indians From Georgia, (New York: Amo Press and The
New York Times, 1969),229.
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The Cherokee were separated from their homes and possessions and incarcerated
while awaiting emigration. Ross ultimately accepted the inevitability of removal, and
began facilitating the transition among the Cherokee from resistance to relocation.303
Ross received permission from Poinsett to take over the preparation for removal and to
oversee the transportation of his tribe to Indian Country.304 His ability to carry out the
safe relocation of his people was compromised by the reluctance of Poinsett to
adequately protect the Cherokee emigrants, or fund their journey. In August 1838, Ross
explained to Poinsett's military commander, General Scott, the hardship of "the
emigration of our whole population; comprising all the conditions of human life; the sick,
the infirm, from helpless infancy to decrepit age.,,305 Ross, conscious of the reluctance of
the federal government to overspend, reminded Scott that "there are considerations more
weighty, and of more importance to us than saving a few dollars by competing with
speculators.,,306 Yet, Ross' concern for the survival of his tribe was not matched by the
U.S. government.
The journey from Cherokee lands in Georgia to Indian Country, known as the
Trail of Tears, was marked by disease, hardship, and death. Many of the emigrating
Cherokee were destitute because their property had been seized during their detainment
303 Foreman, Indian Removal, 286-290.
304 Ross, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 9.
305 Ross to Scott, Cherokee Agency, August 25, 1838, The Papers ofChief John Ross, 662.
306 Ross to Scott, Cherokee Agency, August 25, 1838, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 662.
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in the military camps, increasing their vulnerability to the elements.307 An account of the
journey appeared in the December edition of the Arkansas Gazette, after twelve hundred
Cherokee had passed through Lawrence County in Smithville, Arkansas, indicated the
presence of death among the Cherokee. "I am informed they are very peaceable and
commit no depredations upon any country through which they pass," the article read, "it
is stated that they have the measles and the whooping cough among them and there is an
average of four deaths per day.,,308 The small snapshot of mortality among Cherokee
emigrants does not convey, however, the price the tribe paid for impeding the expansion
of the United States. Ross' wife and another four to five thousand Cherokee died during
removal.309
The lethality of emigration touched Ross' family, but he survived to continue to
lead the Cherokee Nation once he arrived in Indian Country. By the spring of 1839, the
majority of the Cherokee had arrived in Indian Country and reunited with members of the
Treaty Party. Ross' party was joined in the new territory by the Texas Cherokee. The
Texas Cherokee had also forcibly removed from their homes that winter, but by the
Republic of Texas.310 There was a contest for power and a shortage of resources in
Indian Country. The Old Settlers had lived in Indian Country since they ceded their lands
in 1817 and the Treaty Party had established their position in the years following the
307 Duffield, "Cherokee Emigration," 329-330.
308 Arkansas Gazette, December 20, 1838.
309 Duffield, "Cherokee Emigration," 339-340.
310 Everett, The Texas Cherokee, 113.
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Treaty ofNew Echota. The two groups were vastly outnumbered by the emigrating
Cherokee. 311 On June 10, Ross addressed the reunited, but still divided Cherokee Nation,
and attempted to inspire a renewed harmony, saying:
Although many of us have for a series of years past been
separated, yet, we have not and cannot lose sight of the fact
that we are all in the household of the Cherokee family and
of one blood. We have already met, shook hands and
conversed together. In recognizing and embracing each
other as Countrymen, friends and relations, let us kindle
our social fire and take measures for cementing our reunion
as a nation, by establishing a the basis for a government
suited to the conditions and wants of the whole people;
whereby, wholesome laws may be enacted and
administered for the security and protection of property,
life and other sacred rights, of the community.312
On June 21, Ross and members of the Old Settler party together called a
convention for July 1, with the goal of unifying the Cherokee nation under a new
constitution.313 The next day, unknown assailants murdered Elias Boudinot, Major Ridge
and his son.314 Ross immediately informed General Arbuckle, the military leader
stationed in Indian Country, of the killings. "It has become my painful duty to report to
you that I have just heard that Elias Boudinot is killed," Ross wrote.315 Ross invited
General Arbuckle to investigate the crimes, writing: "I trust that you will deem it
3ll Morris Wardell, A Political History ofthe Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907 (Norman: Oklahoma University
Press, 1938), 14-16.
312 Ross to the General Council of the Cherokees, Takatoka, Cherokee Nation, June 10, 1839, The Papers
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315 Ross to General Arbuckle, Park Hill, June 22, 1839, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 717.
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expedient forthwith to interpose and prevent the effusion of innocent blood by exercising
your authority, in order that an unbiased investigation might be had in the matter.,,316
The murders of Boudinot and the Ridges were most likely the acts of followers of
Ross, who resented the men's acquiescence to the Treaty ofNew Echota.317 After the
killings, and in the face of growing unrest among the divided Cherokee, Ross continued
to work toward the formation ofa united Cherokee government. After the Cherokee
convention on June 1, an Act of Union was drawn up for the nation on July 12.318 The
Treaty Party led a delegation to Washington to protest Ross' leadership in Indian Country
and accused Ross of fomenting a "political revolution," by "claiming to have formed and
to be in the administration of a government to which all the Cherokee must submit.,,319
Members of the Treaty Party were now part of a small minority in Indian Country, at risk
of losing political power, and vulnerable to the kind of violent retribution suffered by
Boudinot and the Ridges.32o
In September, 1839, Ross cooperated with a faction of the Treaty Party, and
submitted a new Cherokee constitution for federal examination.321 The Cherokee
constitution expanded suffrage, divided the powers of the government into three
316 Ross to General Arbuckle, Park Hill, June 22, 1839, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 717.
317 Ross, The Papers ofChiefJohn Ross, 9.
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branches, and imposed term limits on elected officials. The constitution protected both
collective and private property rights and included the guarantees of basic human
liberties.322 Poinsett's representatives in Indian Country hesitated to approve Ross'
constitution and validate his authority over the entire Cherokee population, and his
continued refusal to recognize the legality ofthe Treaty ofNew Echota. Poinsett
demanded that General Arbuckle make finding the killers of Boudinot and the Ridges his
first priority, and in November he cited the continued violence among the Cherokee as
his motivation to discontinue federal annuity payments (the money pledged to the
Cherokee Nation for reimbursement for removal costs and in exchange for their
territories) to Ross and all the recent arrivals.323 However, the lack of financial assistance
from the federal government and the refusal to recognize Ross' government did not
dislodge him from his position of authority. Ross continued to lead the Cherokee Nation
with widespread poplar support.
On April 22, 1840, the Cherokee Nation again requested federal recognition of
their constitution. However, Poinsett had set criteria for federal recognition that was
untenable to the majority of Cherokee.324 The first of Poinsett' s demands, that the
Cherokee adhere to "a new constitution, that will insure... the abolition of all such cruel
and savage acts as that under which the unfortunate Ridges and Boudinot were so
inhumanly and brutally murdered," and conform "to the constitutional laws of the United
322 Wardell, A Political History ofthe Cherokee 44.
323 Wardell, A Political History ofthe Cherokee, 41.
324 Wardell, A Political History ofthe Cherokee, 40.
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State," while sharing political power between "officers from each party, in reference to
their numbers," reflected recognizable republican values.325 However, Poinsett's final
condition for federal approval of the Cherokee republic-building project was Ross'
permanent exclusion from political leadership.326 Poinsett justified his attempt to remove
Ross from power by implicating him in the murders of his opponents, although such
suspicions were unsubstantiated. Ross' true threat to Poinsett lay in the support Ross
continued to garner from the vast majority of the Cherokee people and his unflagging
effort to expose the illegal nature of the Treaty ofNew Echota.
Ross did not lose power, despite Poinsett's efforts to destroy him, and continued
to refuse to validate the seizure of Cherokee lands. On June 22, 1840, the Cherokee
agreed on an Act ofUnion although conditions in the nation were dangerous. Violence
between the Cherokee factions continued. Shortages resulting from the federal
manipulation of annuity payments further exacerbated the deprivation that was wrought
by removal. Poinsett continued to withhold annuities until late in the fall. Ross
condemned Poinsett for his refusal to recognize Ross' government and the will of the
Cherokee electorate, even though Poinsett himself had observed, "that the majority shall
rule is an axiom in politics now substantially admitted everywhere and one that must
prevail universally.,,327 Ross understood that through attempting to exclude Ross from the
325 Crawford to Poinsett, War Department, Office ofIndian Affairs, March 30, 1840, Serial Set 366, Doc.
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Cherokee government, and thereby overturn the will of the Cherokee people, Poinsett
was "making to annihilate all that has been done in our country and to substitute for it the
will of the Secretary ofWar.,,328 Poinsett's rejection of the legitimacy of Ross' executive
position in the Cherokee Nation, which derived from the will of the majority of Cherokee
voters, seemed to Ross "to result from a preconcerted scheme...to denationalize us under
the pretext of necessity; to legislate us into nonentity."
Poinsett was never able to bring about Ross' removal from the political leadership
of the Cherokee. Ross continued to lead the Cherokee Nation through the tumultuous
years following removal, and the deprivation, vigilantism, and contests for power and
resources that plagued the tribe. By September of 1843, an Indian Affairs Agent reported
on the clear evidence of Cherokee republicanism. "Their own institutions are entirely
germane to our own," Agent Butler wrote to T. Hartley Crawford, "The government is
founded on republican principles and modeled after the Constitution of the United States.
Justice is administered with impartiality and dignity... almost in every respect; the
Cherokees have lost the habits of barbarous origin, and fitted themselves for a moral
affinity and political affinity with the civilized race.,,329 The republican values of the
Cherokee Nation, and of its Principal Chief, were resilient. The instability of tribal
discord and vengeance, the trauma of emigration, and the interference of Poinsett could
not subsume their pursuit of a political system that incorporated liberty and virtue into a
plan for national survival.
328 Agent P.M. Butler to Crawford, Fort Gibson, September 30, 1843, Serial Set 434, no. 229, 9.
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Poinsett met with mixed success with the Cherokee Nation. He may have
racia1ized his understanding of culture and civilization in order to deny the Cherokee
sovereignty over their homeland, but he could not prevent them from internalizing the
very ideology that he had deployed against them. He removed the Cherokee from
Georgia, but could not remove Ross from power, or prevent Ross from recording the
fundamentally dishonest and criminal behavior of the federal government towards the
Cherokee Nation.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
After analyzing different expressions of nineteenth-century American
republicanism manifested by Joel Roberts Poinsett in Chile, Mexico, and the Cherokee
Nation, it becomes clear that the paradox of imperial republicanism is not so inscrutable.
When land is seen as the foundation of a unique republican experiment and the source of
virtue for its citizens, efforts to extend the sphere of liberty can lead to dominion over
others. The internationalist tendencies reflected in the Jeffersonian-era rhetoric of 'sister
republics' made sense of a republic seeking to distinguish itself from European empires,
but did not feed the republic's need for land. That the land was occupied, or part of
another republic's territory, caused an incongruence between ideology and pragmatism.
The relationship between these ill-fitting parts became more problematic as the demand
for land became more pronounced.
As illustrated by Poinsett's ambiguous and contested place in history, this
relationship was often hopelessly riddled with contradiction, self-interest, and mutually
exclusive components. Poinsett's attempt to help develop an independent nation with a
liberal constitution and a free press in Chile could be discarded as a cynical attempt to
curry favor with, and assert cultural dominance over, an emerging market and nation. Yet
III
Poinsett fought for Chilean independence, and worked to foster the universal truths he
believed made his nation superior. Likewise, Poinsett's involvement with the early
Mexican republic is easily obscured by the territorial acquisition he facilitated. At the
same time, he supported the diffusion of ideology that resonated with thousands of
Mexicans, leperos and intellectuals alike. This resonance carried into the Texas
Revolution, a civil war of secession that was construed by many as the triumph of
republican values over despotism and vice. Yet the self-evident righteousness of the
American system required further explanation in the face of critics who questioned the
annexation of Texas, Indian Removal and the extension of slavery.
Poinsett linked U.S. racial and political superiority in his essay on civilization in
1834, and explained to himself and his audience the authenticity of his republicanism.
Once fully racialized and narrowed to exclude Native Americans and others not
considered white, Poinsett's ideologies were not undermined by his policies toward the
Cherokees, but instead required their removal. The belief in Native American inferiority,
asserted through Poinsett's collection of 'evidence,' and the scholarship of others,
compelled servants of the republic to employ draconian measures to excise, in the words
of Jefferson, the "blot[s] ...on the surface.,,33o Poinsett anticipated the extinction of the
Indians, and their terminal condition perhaps, however inexcusably, lessened the value he
put on their lives. Furthermore, the absence ofIndians, in Poinsett's view, bolstered the
strength of the true republicans, who, civilized and marked by whiteness, were entitled to
the land.
330 Jefferson, The Works ofThomas Jefferson, 317.
112
The purpose of this thesis is certainly not to exonerate the "author of all that is
evil," or to absolve the engineer of the Trail of Tears.331 To accept Poinsett at his word
would be to ignore the evidence of duplicity, manipulation, and manufactured tragedy.
However, dismissing his career as an example of rampant self-interest and empty of all
principle would also neglect the powerful certainties that motivated him, and in many
ways, the nation he represented. Forging ground between cynicism and naivete, students
of republicanism and the early nineteenth-century Americas, must navigate evidence of
compelling ideologies, and the Machiavellian actions taken by men like Poinsett to
perpetuate them. Above all, Poinsett was a faithful servant to a nation both imperial and
republican. The independence and virtue that enabled American republicanism were
guaranteed through access to sufficient land, while also dependent on convincing
assurances of an authentic, national ideology,
While Poinsett's shadow loomed large in the early nineteenth century, his role in
the imperial direction of the early republic is not widely known or celebrated. Poinsett's
legacy as a statesman and Indian remover is not well remembered and few outside of the
discipline of history can connect the man to the popular Christmas flower he introduced
to the United States in the 1820s.332 In Mexico, his name lives on as a pejorative and
descriptive noun: poinsettismo, which connotes Yankee meddling and efforts at
331 Gamboa, Representaci6n del ciudadana sindica, 8.
332 Poinsett brought the flar de nachebuena from Mexico to the United States, where the flower was
renamed the Poinsettia.
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hemispheric domination.333 Perhaps less inspirational than other American patriots,
Poinsett is nevertheless a thread that connects the history of four nations and a harbinger
of American Empire.
333 Jose Vasconcelos, Breve historia de Mexico (Mexico DF: Compafiia Editorial Continental SA, 1980),
315; Ernest E. Rossi and Jack C. Plano, Latin American Political Dictionary (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio,
1980),240.
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